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DILUTION-BY-BLURRING: A THEORY CAUGHT IN THE
SHADOW OF TRADEMARK INFRINGEMENT
Kathleen B. McCabe'
"Dilution... remains a somewhat nebulous concept...."
Trademarks, the names, slogans, or symbols used by companies or
individuals to identify and advertise their products and services to
consumers,2 primarily function to ensure that consumers receive a
consistent level of quality in the goods and services they purchase in
the marketplace.' Trademarks are "merchandising short-cut[s]"4
because such marks efficiently convey to consumers that they vill
receive the same goods that they have previously purchased. Because
trademarks are such an important tool, for businesses in marketing
their goods and for consumers in purchasing them, both federal and
state statutes have been passed to protect their commercial value.5
* J.D. Candidate, 2001, Fordham University School of Law. I would like to
thank my father, James McCabe, for his continuous love and support.
1. Sally Gee, Inc. v. Myra Hogan, Inc., 699 F.2d 621, 625 (2d Cir. 1983). The
Second Circuit held that the interest protected by the New York anti-dilution statute
included both commercial goodwill and the selling power that a distinctive mark has
created in the minds of the public. The court recognized that dilution was not defined
by the state statute, but remained a cause of action even absent competition, and thus
was separate from an infringement remedy. See id. at 624-25.
2. See 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1994) ("The term 'trademark' includes any word, name,
symbol, or device, or any combination thereof... [used] to identify and distinguish
his or her goods... from those manufactured or sold by others and to indicate the
source of the goods...."); see also 3 Rudolf Callmann, The Law of Unfair
Competition, Trademarks and Monopolies § 17.01, at 1-3 (4th ed. 1981) (stating that
trademarks function to indicate ownership, guarantee constancy, and advertise the
good or service).
3. See 1 J. Thomas McCarthy, McCarthy on Trademarks and Unfair Competition
§ 2:3, at 2-3 (4th ed. Dec. 1999) ("[A] trademark is merely a symbol that allows a
purchaser to identify goods or services that have been satisfactory in the past and
reject goods or services that have failed to give satisfaction."). Trademark protection
is for the overall impressions of the marks, incorporating visual, auditory, and
definitional similarities of the marks. See 3 McCarthy, § 23:25, at 23-64.7 to 23-64.8.
In a dilution claim, trademarks must be essentially the same to warrant protection.
See 4 McCarthy, § 24:90.2, at 24-151.
4. Mishawaka Rubber & Woolen Mfg. Co. v. S.S. Kresge Co., 316 U.S. 203. 205
(1942). Justice Frankfurter, in the majority opinion, wrote that the purpose of
trademarks is "to convey through the mark, in the minds of potential customers, the
desirability of the commodity upon which it appears. Once this is attained, the trade-
mark owner has something of value." Id.
5. See S. Rep. No. 79-1333 (1946), reprinted in 1946 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1274, 1274
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While historically courts stalled in affording these statutory
protections to aggrieved plaintiffs, over the past fifty years courts have
increasingly granted protections against the most frequent trademark
violation, infringement. As trademark doctrine has developed, the
prevention of infringement, or the unauthorized use of another's
mark,6 has become the focus of nearly all trademark litigation. The
"keystone" of measuring trademark infringement is the likelihood-of-
confusion test,7 which measures a customer's confusion, often at the
time of sale, about the source of a good.8 This confusion typically
leads to the purchase of an inferior product. However, while
protection against trademark infringement has heightened, other
trademark protections, such as the remedy for dilution, have largely
been ignored.
Trademark dilution occurs when a person or company uses a mark
identical or substantially similar to a pre-existing trademark,
triggering a mental association on the part of the consumer between
the two marks, thereby eroding the strength of the original mark.'
Dilution can take several forms, including dilution-by-blurring,
tarnishment, and cybersquatting. 1° Dilution-by-blurring is the most
common dilution claim, and occurs when a consumer views a junior,
unauthorized use of a famous mark and is reminded of the more
famous mark.1 Famous examples of dilution-by-blurring include
Dupont shoes, Buick aspirin, and Kodak pianos.1 2
Dilution evolved from the more traditional trademark claim of
infringement, in which a trademark is "stolen" from the senior user by
a junior user in order to entice a customer into mistakenly buying the
junior user's product, thus confusing it for the senior user's. 3 For
example, a junior user who begins manufacturing Rice's Peanut
Butter Cups in a bright orange package will most likely confuse
members of the public into believing they are actually purchasing
Reese's Peanut Butter Cups, and that junior user is therefore guilty of
trademark infringement. In a dilution scenario, however, a junior user
typically uses a pre-existing trademark on items that bear no relation
(stating that the purpose of any trademark legislation is two-fold: first, to protect the
public's interest in purchasing the brand or service they intend to purchase, and
second, to protect a trademark owner's investment in the mark).
6. See Black's Law Dictionary 781 (6th ed. 1990).
7. See 3 McCarthy, supra note 3, § 23:1, at 23-6.
8. See id. § 23:5, at 23-15.
9. See 4 McCarthy, supra note 3, § 24:67, at 24-119.
10. For a discussion on dilution-by-blurring, tarnishment, and cybersquatting, see
infra Part I.D.1.
11. See 4 McCarthy, supra note 3, § 24:68, at 24-120. For a discussion of dilution-
by-blurring, see infra Part I.D.1.
12. See H.R. Rep. No. 104-374, at 3 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1029,
1030.
13. See 4 McCarthy, supra note 3, § 24:1, at 24-6.
1828 [Vol. 68
DILUTION-BY-BLURRING
to those that the trademark was originally associated with." Thus, a
junior user might use the "Blockbuster" name on fireworks, rather
than on a product related to video entertainment. 5 While the public
is not confused into believing that Blockbuster Video has sponsored
the manufacture of fireworks, the Blockbuster trademark has
nevertheless been weakened, because the public will begin to
associate the mark with both video entertainment and fireworks.
The fifty-three year relationship between trademark dilution and
the courts has not been a smooth one. 6 Dilution has long stood in the
shadow of the traditional standard of trademark infringement. As
courts and legal theorists have vacillated between embracing dilution
as a redressable wrong that undermines the goodwill and investment
made by business owners, and banishing it to the realm of quasi-
property rights, afraid that full recognition of the doctrine will result
in the grant of a monopoly to the owner on the trademark's language
and design.17 While the Supreme Court, Congress, and state
legislatures increasingly recognize that providing a remedy for
dilution is necessary to maintain a competitive economy,'" courts
appear more reluctant to embrace wholeheartedly the doctrine,
particularly in a dilution-by-blurring claim. 9 They fear that full
recognition of dilution would move trademark protections toward
14. While dilution generally occurs between non-competing goods, dilution can
also be found in the case of competitive goods. Some courts, however, recognize
dilution only in the case of non-competing goods. See id. § 24:72, at 24-128 to 24-129.
15. See Viacom Inc. v. Ingram Enters., Inc., 141 F.3d 886,887-88 (8th Cir. 1998).
16. See, eg., Lynda J. Oswald, "Tarnishment" and "Blurring" Under the Federal
Trademark Dilution Act of 1995,36 Am. Bus. LJ. 255,267 (1999) (opining that courts
were reluctant to apply state anti-dilution statutes); Brendan Mahaffey-Dowd, Note,
Famous Trademarks: Ordinary Inquiry by the Courts of Marks Entitled to an
Extraordinary Remedy, 64 Brook. L. Rev. 423. 426 (1998) (stating that the lack of an
easily utilized test for dilution has created uncertainty in dilution law). Frank I.
Schechter has been credited with the introduction of the concept of dilution to the
American legal system in his 1927 article The Rational Basis of Trademark Protection,
40 Harv. L. Rev. 813, 830 (1927) [hereinafter Schechter, Rational Basis]. Professor
Schechter did not use the term "dilution" in his article, but discussed its theory in
detail. See id. at 824-30.
17. See, e.g., Allied Maintenance Corp. v. Allied Mechanical Trades, Inc., 399
N.Y.S.2d 628, 631 (1977) ("Generally, courts which have had the opportunity to
interpret an anti-dilution statute have refused to apply its provisions literally."). The
opinion went on to recognize the dilution doctrine as a viable remedy, calling dilution
"a cancer-like growth of dissimilar products." Id. at 632.
18. See H.R. Rep. No. 104-374, at 3 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1029,
1030; S. Rep. No. 79-1333 (1946), reprinted in 1946 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1274, 1275 (Senate
Committee on Patents noting that "[tirade-marks, indeed, are the essence of
competition, because they make possible a choice between competing articles by
enabling the buyer to distinguish one from the other"); see also Two Pesos, Inc. v.
Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 774 (1992) ("National protection of trademarks is
desirable... because trademarks foster competition and the maintenance of quality
by securing to the producer the benefits of good reputation." (quoting Park 'N Fly,
Inc. v. Dollar Park and Fly, Inc., 469 U.S. 189, 198 (1985))).
19. For a discussion of dilution-by-blurring, see infra Part I.D.l.
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property rights in gross, rather than remain a quasi-property right,
thus resulting in a grant of monopoly to big businesses. 0 Courts are
comfortable with the body of decision created in recognition of
traditional infringement standards, which focus on protecting the
public, but seem uneasy in granting trademark owners the even more
powerful weapon of a remedy for trademark dilution.2 1  This
reluctance is due to the perception that dilution "is a potent legal tool,
which must be carefully used as a scalpel, not a sledgehammer, 22
because improperly applied, dilution without limitations is "a rogue
law that turns every trademark, no matter how weak, into an anti-
competitive weapon."'  Moreover, the dilution doctrine is commonly
misunderstood by courts, laboring under the impression that dilution
is a consequence of infringement, and that confusion must therefore
be found in order to sustain a dilution claim.24
This Note proposes that the doctrine of dilution is alive, but not
well. Courts typically recognize dilution as a claim separate from
infringement but fail to recognize the accompanying standards that
measure dilution. Courts often erroneously decide dilution claims,
particularly dilution-by-blurring, with the language of infringement, if
not the infringement standard itself. This Note introduces each of the
three types of dilution, but focuses on dilution-by-blurring as the most
misunderstood and misapplied of dilution claims. Part I evaluates the
history of dilution in light of the development of trademark
infringement law, including the introduction of dilution and its
development in state courts. Part II reviews the passage of the
Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995 ("FTDA") in response to
the increased state, agency, and academic support for dilution claims,
and the Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act of 1999, the
recent amendment to the Lanham Act. Part III examines the courts'
mixed reaction to the FTDA in dilution-by-blurring claims, and the
common mistakes made by courts in evaluating a blurring claim, often
stemming from the continued overshadowing of dilution by traditional
infringement standards, as well as the artificial limitations imposed on
a dilution remedy by the courts. Finally, Part IV proposes that the
courts' uneven and erroneous analyses of dilution-by-blurring claims
20. A property-right-in-gross is one that is similar to the rights attached to real
property. On the other hand, a quasi-property right in trademark is one with limited
protections, based primarily on the protection of the public from confusion. For a
discussion of trademarks as property rights, see infra Part I.B.
21. See Mahaffey-Dowd, supra note 16, at 424. For the definition of dilution, see
infra Part I.D.1.
22. Viacom Inc. v. Ingram Enters., Inc., 141 F.3d 886, 892 (8th Cir. 1998) (quoting
3 McCarthy, supra note 3, § 24:114, at 24-208.
23. Id. at 891.
24. Because the dilution doctrine grants remedies for three separate and distinct
types of dilution, courts are forced to create three separate standards for deciding
dilution claims, further confounding courts' understanding and analysis of the
doctrine. For a discussion of the three types of dilution, see infra Part I.D. 1.
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are due to an unwillingness to grant property rights in gross to a
trademark owner,2I compounded by the courts' misunderstanding of
dilution and a reluctance to engage in judicial innovation. This
reluctance is fueled by the lack of a clear standard with which courts
can measure blurring. The Note concludes by defining dilution as
characterizing a separate state of perception from infringement, and
advocates a comprehensive list of factors for analyzing a dilution-by-
blurring cause of action, including the most important but most
neglected factor in a dilution claim, the mental association triggered
by the junior use.
Courts confronting a blurring claim must acknowledge the value of
the dilution doctrine. They should not fear that following the clear
language of the FTDA will result in a grant of property rights in gross,
and thus a monopoly of language, through relief on a blurring claim.
By using a modification of the Mead Data Central, Inc. v. Toyota
Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc.26 factors," courts can correctly evaluate a
blurring claim without conferring unlimited property rights on a
trademark owner. Further, the language of the FTDA limits relief in
dilution to only the most famous of marks, in a commercial use.
Indeed, courts need only look to tarnishment and cybersquatting
claims to recognize that such limitations can be successful.2 The
recognition of dilution as a separate and viable trademark claim,
rather than a monopolistic threat, is necessary in today's rapidly
evolving marketplace. Continued shadowing of a dilution remedy by
infringement undermines the entire doctrine of dilution and results in
less investment in marks by their owners, to the public's detriment. In
the modem marketplace, consumers need more information to make
an informed purchasing decision, not less.
I. A BRIEF HISTORY OF TRADEMARK AND DILUTION
This part briefly defines and sets forth the history of trademark and
trademark infringement, discussing the effect of these broad doctrines
on the more narrow remedy for trademark dilution. It then describes
the stilted evolution of dilution claims at common law.
25. The term "property" is defined as an "unrestricted and exclusive right to a
thing; [with] the right to dispose of a thing in every legal way." Black's Law
Dictionary 1216 (6th ed. 1990). In contrast, a trademark property right is contingent
on commercial use and maintenance of the mark, along with the good or service it
indicates. See United Drug Co. v. Theodore Rectanus Co., 248 U.S. 90, 97 (1918)
(holding that trademark rights are contingent on an affiliated trade or business).
26. 875 F.2d 1026 (2d Cir. 1989).
27. See id. at 1035 (Sweet, J., concurring). For a discussion of a proposed
modification of the Mead Data factors, see infra Part IV.
28. For a discussion on cybersquatting and tarnishment, see infra Part I.D.1.
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A. Trademarks: Friend or Foe?
Trademarks are the symbols used by companies to identify their
products and services to consumers. The use of a trademark as an
identifying mechanism removes the need for consumers to inspect the
quality of the good or service at each and every purchase, an almost
impossible task in the modern era of sealed packages and shrink-
wrap.29 Due to the value purchasers place on identifying mechanisms,
Congress and state legislatures have passed statutes protecting a
trademark owner's property right in its mark. 0 The purpose of
trademark law is to promote economic efficiency 3' and incentivize
businesses to invest in a mark, to the benefit of the consumer.32
Despite statutory advancements during the past century in protecting
trademarks, the nature of this protection continues to be embroiled in
controversy, particularly in the area of dilution claims.
Critics of trademark law, known as "restrictionists, 3 3 warn that
federal trademark protection results in a restraint on the free use of
language, a monopoly of trade by big businesses, and an overall
decrease in competition to the detriment of the consumer.34 Because
trademark protections grant mark holders the ability to prevent
competitors from using the language and design of a registered mark
to describe their own products, restrictionists argue that the result is
both a monopoly on language and a dampening of competition-small
and unrecognized mark holders are prevented from using well-
recognized terms to describe their own goods or services.35
Restrictionists also decry the expansion of trademark protections
through the statutory grant of dilution remedies to trademark
owners. 36 Because dilution claims focus on the use of a mark in an
29. See Schechter, Rational Basis, supra note 16, at 818 n.21. The plastic
cellophane envelope that encloses most goods sold today performs the important
function of protecting goods from tampering or damage, but also prevents the
consumer from personally inspecting the good for quality.
30. See S. Rep. No. 79-1333 (1946), reprinted in 1946 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1274, 1274.
31. See 1 McCarthy, supra note 3, § 2:3, at 2-3.
32. See id. at 2-4.
33. See Simone A. Rose, Will Atlas Shrug? Dilution Protection For "Famous"
Trademarks: Anti-Competitive "Monopoly" or Earned "Property" Right?, 47 Fla. L.
Rev. 653, 675 (1995) (describing and critiquing the restrictionist point of view).
34. See id. at 679.
35. Trademark holders may not, however, register terms deemed to be non-
distinctive. Terms that are considered to be generic, such as "milk" or "dairy" for
dairy products, or descriptive of the good sold, such as "creamy" or "rich", are not
registerable. But descriptive terms may be registered and protected if the mark
holder can show that the term has achieved secondary meaning, that is, that the
public, upon hearing the term, attributes it to the mark holder. For example, if the
owner of "Creamy" milk products creates substantial recognition in the term
"creamy" as affiliated with her products, she may federally register the mark, and
competitors will thereafter be enjoined from using the term "creamy" to describe
their own products. See 3 Callmann, supra note 2, § 18.01, at 2-3.
36. For a discussion of dilution under common law, see infra Part I.D.2. For a
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unrelated market of goods and services, some critics question whether
the identification element upon which Congress and other legislatures
base their protections is a valid one, or whether the dilution doctrine
merely grants increased property rights to trademark owners in the
form of trademark protections. These critics describe marks as
merely another form of advertising, designed to entice consumers to
purchase a product or service they neither want nor need," rather
than an essential identification tool. Such allegations exist even
today,39 and characterize dilution as a "remedy without a wrong." I
Due to this belief in the need to restrict the property rights granted
through trademarks, the restrictionist point of view both illustrates
and reinforces courts' reluctance to expand trademark protections
beyond the scope of infringement to encompass dilution claims.
Trademark proponents concede that while trademark protections
grant the holder a limited monopoly on language," which enables
them to control use of the mark,12 they contest the negative
implications of that limited right. Proponents reason that "[aill that
the plaintiff in such cases asks is the preservation of a valuable ... link
between him and his consumer, that has been created by his ingenuity
and the merit of his wares or services [because] '[a]ll the rest of
infinity is open to defendant."'43 Moreover, because the trademark
holder created value in the mark and introduced it into commerce, she
discussion of the Federal Trademark Dilution Act and the subsequent handling of
dilution claims by the courts, see hifra Parts II, III.
37. See Mark A. Lemley, The Modern Lanham Act and the Death of Comnzon
Sense, 108 Yale L.J. 1687, 1689 (1999).
38. See Ralph S. Brown, Jr., Advertising and the Public Interest: Legal Protection
of Trade Symbols, 108 Yale LJ. 1619, 1635 (1999) (characterizing trademarks in the
modem era as a "bombardment of stupefying symbols"); Glynn S. Lunney, Jr.,
Trademark Monopolies, 48 Emory L.J. 367, 428-29 (1999) (describing a consumer's
response to trademarks as "Pavlovian," and noting that "the consumer's rational and
conscious mind may simply disengage from the buying process, and the consumer may
fail to recognize potentially competing substitutes should they become available").
39. See, e.g., Lemley, supra note 37, at 1696.
[Plropertizing trademarks comes at a rather significant cost to society.
Sometimes that cost takes the form of lost opportunities: Important political
and social commentary and works of art may be suppressed entirely. It may
also take the form of higher prices .... Our language and our culture are
impoverished when we cannot use the most familiar words to discuss-or
make fun of, or criticize-the products and companies that are the basis of
our economy.
Id But see Rose, supra note 33, at 663 (arguing that not all limited property right
monopolies are negative or anti-competitive).
40. See Kenneth L. Port, The "Unnatural" Expansion of Trademark Rights: Is a
Federal Dilution Statute Necessary?, 18 Seton Hall Legis. J. 433,488 (1994).
41. See Schechter, Rational Basis, supra note 16, at 833; Rose, supra note 33, at
667.
42. See Port, supra note 40, at 487-88.
43. See Schechter, Rational Basis, supra note 16, at 833 (quoting Coca-Cola Co. v.
Old Dominion Beverage Corp., 271 F. 600,604 (4th Cir. 1921)).
2000] 1833
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
is adding to the free use of language, not detracting from it.44 Thus,
advocates argue that trademarks in fact encourage competition and
trade by providing the public with the information it requires to make
an educated purchase,45 and incentivize companies to develop marks
that are unique or arbitrary. 6
Because a dilution cause of action grants more protection than a
standard infringement claim,47  courts traditionally feared that
protection from dilution would reduce market competition. Despite
the arguments of proponents of trademark protection, the fear of
monopoly exists even today, affecting courts' decisions in determining
the relief to be granted in any type of trademark claim.4 8 Courts are
reluctant to grant what they perceive to be a monopoly in the
language of the trademark. Courts therefore will often employ legal
gymnastics to reject a dilution claim, imposing artificial limitations on
the dilution remedy. As a result, the dilution doctrine has been
distorted by the courts in ways that defy or misconstrue its original
purpose and parameters.49
B. Trademarks as Property Rights
While copyrights, patents, or real property are considered property
in gross,50 trademarks are recognized only as quasi-property, with
limited rights and protections very different from those associated
with full-blown property rights.5 1 Black's Law Dictionary defines
44. See Rose, supra note 33, at 662.
45. See id. at 675-76.
46. A mark that is unique or fanciful is one that has been invented or selected for
the sole purpose of functioning as a trademark. See 2 McCarthy, supra note 3, § 11:5,
at 11-12. An arbitrary mark is one that is commonly used in language, but when used
as a trademark for goods or services neither suggests nor describes any characteristic
of those goods or services. See id. § 11:11, at 11-15 to 11-16.
47. For the definition of dilution and a discussion on the remedies afforded a
dilution claim, see infra Part I.D.1.
48. See, e.g., Viacom Inc. v. Ingram Enters., Inc., 141 F.3d 886, 892 (8th Cir. 1998)
("Viacom is seeking a complete monopoly on the use of a rather common word with
multiple meanings .... ").
49. See, e.g., Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. Utah Div.
of Travel Dev., 170 F.3d 449 (4th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 120 S. Ct. 286 (1999)
(requiring a plaintiff to demonstrate actual dilution to succeed in a dilution claim).
For a discussion of recent efforts by the courts to legitimize dilution as a remedy, see
infra Part III.
50. The Supreme Court recently hailed the right to exclude others as "[tihe
hallmark of a protected property interest." College Sav. Bank v. Florida Prepaid
Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 119 S. Ct. 2219, 2224 (1999). The Court further
clarified that the right of exclusion is "one of the most essential sticks in the bundle of
rights that are commonly characterized as property." Id. (quoting Kaiser Aetna v.
United States, 444 U.S. 164, 176 (1979)).
51. See, e.g., Playboy Enters. Inc. v. Netscape Communications Corp., 52
U.S.P.Q.2d 1162, 1170 (C.D. Cal. 1999) (recognizing that a trademark is "not an
omnibus property right or a monopoly on the use of the words in the trademark"),
affd by 202 F.3d 278 (9th. Cir. 1999). Restricting protections granted to trademark
1834 [Vol. 68
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property as an "unrestricted and exclusive right to a thing; [with] the
right to dispose of a thing in every legal way." 2  In contrast, a
trademark property right is contingent on commercial use and
maintenance of the mark and the good or service it indicates.
Specifically, property rights in trademark are defined in light of
protecting the public, and are largely limited to the right to prevent
customer confusion or dilution of a mark.-9
This limited protection is the result of the historic jurisprudential
uncertainty over whether trademarks encompassed property rights or
simply operated as claims of unfair competition.' While some
theorists have opined that trademark claims sound in trespass 5 a
claim traditionally affiliated with property in gross, trademark law is
instead viewed as a tort, developing from the notion of unfair
competition.56 Unfair competition has its roots in the American
business philosophy of fairness in commerce s' and in turn evolved
from the commercial tort of fraud and deceits- where one passed off
her work as the goods of another.59 It has also been suggested that
trademark violations were originally deemed to be property, but that
remedies historically originated in tort rather than trespass because
injunctions for trademark infringement' were not available in a claim
of trespass.61 Hence, because of trademark's mixed evolution from
both unfair competition and trespass theories, courts use elements of
both the tort of deceit and trespass of property in deciding a claim,
which results in quasi-property protections.6
owners is justified by both arguments against a grant of property rights in gross and a
fear of monopoly. For a discussion on the role of monopoly concerns in trademark
dilution cases, see supra Part I.A.
52. Black's Law Dictionary 1216 (6th ed. 1990).
53. See 1 McCarthy, supra note 3, § 2:14, at 2-30.1 to 2-31.
54. See Frank I. Schechter, Historical Foundations of Trade-mark Law 151-52
(1925) [hereinafter Schechter, Foundations of Trademark].
55. See Port, supra note 40, at 465-66.
56. See id. at 465.
57. See 1 McCarthy, supra note 3, § 1:8, at 1-16.
58. See Port, supra note 40, at 465.
59. See 1 McCarthy, supra note 3, § 5:2, at 5-3.
60. See Keith M. Stolte, How Early Did Anglo-American Trademark Law Begin?
An Answer to Schechter's Conundnn, 8 Fordham Intell. Prop. Media & Ent. LI. 505,
511-12 (1998) (describing the first known trademark infringement case, decided some
time in the sixteenth century, in which a clothier affixed another's mark to his own
goods, as an action heard on the tort of deceit).
61. See id.
62. See Port, supra note 40, at 466.
The law of unfair competition has its roots in the common-law tort of deceit:
its general concern is with protecting consumers from confusion as to source.
While that concern may result in the creation of "quasi-property rights" in
communicative symbols, the focus is on the protection of consumers, not the
protection of producers as an incentive to product innovation.
Id (quoting Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 157 (1989)
(emphasis omitted)); Schechter, Foundations of Trademark, supra note 54, at 151-52.
The courts... have wavered between the two horns of a dilemma. While
2000] 1835
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Accordingly, while the intellectual labor invested in copyrights and
patents is directly protected under the Constitution,63 trademark
protection is rooted in the Commerce Clause,64 which is predicated on
guaranteeing a predictable and consistent source of goods in
commerce to the public. Unlike patents or copyrights, trademarks do
not protect the intellectual investment of an underlying work, but are
instead symbols that indicate source. Any goodwill or return of
investment relates back to the source of the good, not to the symbol
itself.65
Courts have thus strictly limited trademark protection to a quasi-
property right,66 finding that "the exclusive 'property' right of a
trademark is defined by customer perception."67 Hence, a
'property right' or protection accorded a trademark owner can only
be understood in the context of trademark law and its purposes. A
trademark owner has a property right only insofar as is necessary to
prevent consumer confusion as to who produced the goods and to
facilitate differentiation of the trademark owner's goods.('
As a result, a mark holder does not fully enjoy the use of her
trademarks, because there are limitations on the use of them. For
example, trademark owners may not license use of the mark without
ensuring that the underlying product will maintain the current level of
quality.69 Another limitation on ownership is that the right to the
mark is predicated on its use.7" Notwithstanding these limitations,
courts' and theorists' uniform referral to plaintiffs as mark "owners"
implicitly acknowledges trademark property rights.7" Indeed, some
commentators argue that trademarks are already recognized as full
desiring to afford protection to trade-marks, they have at various times
manifested a very strong disinclination to base their relief in such cases upon
a theory of the protection of property, although they have been able to
discover no sound alternative ground for relief.
Id. But see Malla Pollack, Time to Dilute the Dilution Statute and What Not To Do
When Opposing Legislation, 78 J. Pat. & Trademark Off. Soc'y 518, 541-42 (1996)
(suggesting that the Supreme Court's dicta on quasi-property rights is irrelevant to a
trademark analysis because Bonito Boats involved a claim under federal patent law).
63. See U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (giving Congress the power to confer exclusive
rights to authors and inventors for a limited time).
64. See 1 McCarthy, supra note 3, § 6:2, at 6-4.
65. See S. Rep. No. 79-1333 (1946), reprinted in 1946 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1274, 1275.
66. A quasi-property right in a trademark is one that is contingent on protecting
the public from confusion, rather than those rights typically associated with real
property. See 1 McCarthy, supra note 3, § 2:14, at 2-31; Pollack, supra note 62, at 520.
67. 1 McCarthy, supra note 3, § 2:14, at 2-30.
68. International Order of Job's Daughters v. Lindeburg & Co., 633 F.2d 912, 919
(9th Cir. 1980).
69. See Pollack, supra note 62, at 532. Without these quality controls, the mark is
deemed abandoned.
70. See Rock & Roll Hall of Fame and Museum, Inc. v. Gentile Prods., 71 F.
Supp. 2d 755,758 (N.D. Ohio 1999).
71. See 3 Callmann, supra note 2, § 17.07, at 30-31.
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property by the IRS, bankruptcy courts, and accountants, and should
be recognized as such by the judiciary. 2
Dilution is different from an infringement claim, however, because
dilution "shifts the focus away from consumer protection and towards
the protection of an owner's quasi-property right in a famous mark,
itself. ' 73 Dilution is prototypically a "diminution of plaintiff's name as
an advertising tool"'74 for underlying goods or services." The Supreme
Court recently held, however, that a "generalized right to be secure in
one's business interests" does not qualify as a property right protected
by the Due Process Clause.76
Because the Court concluded that "business in the sense of the
activity of doing business, or the activity of making a profit is not
property in the ordinary sense,"') it is likely that expansion of
property rights in gross to include dilution will be denied. The conflict
between free competition, unencumbered by monopoly,"' and the
need to protect trademark as a property right was recently described
by one district court:
As a nation, we long have extolled the virtues of free and vigorous
competition, and frequently have cited our devotion to competition
as a principal reason for our nation's unparalleled economic success.
At the same time, we hold no less dear the right of individuals and
corporations to control and use their own property, including
intellectual property such as trademarks.79
Trademarks are thus the casualty of the conflict between open
competition and the protection of ownership, resulting in the
compromise of quasi-property rights. These rights grant trademark
owners limited protections based on consumer perceptions, rather
than on ownership in its own right.
C. Infringement and the Likelihood-of-Confitsion Standard
The function of trademarks as an efficient way to convey
72. See Jerre B. Swann & Theodore H. Davis, Jr., Dilution, an Idea Whose Time
Has Gone; Brand Equity as Protectable Property, the New/Old Paradigm, 1 J. Intell.
Prop. L. 219, 230 (1994). But see Schechter, Rational Basis, supra note 16, at 820
(noting that equity has not treated trademark violations as trespasses on property, but
as unfair competition).
73. Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. Utah Div. of Travel
Dev., 955 F. Supp. 605, 613 n.7 (E.D. Va. 1997). affd. 170 F.3d 449 (4th Cir. 1999),
and cert. denied, 120 S. Ct. 286 (1999).
74. Wedgwood Homes, Inc. v. Lund, 659 P.2d 377,383 (Or. 1983).
75. See College Savings Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. E'xpense
Bd., 119 S. Ct. 2219,2225 (1999).
76. Id- at 2224.
77. Id. at 2225 (emphasis omitted) (discussing property rights in the context of a
false advertising claim).
78. For a discussion of monopoly in trademark, see supra Part I.A.
79. Planet Hollyvood (Region IV), Inc. v. Hollywood Casino Corp., No. 96 C
4660,1999 WL 1131887, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 3, 1999).
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information to the public would be threatened if competitors were
permitted to use the same mark to describe their own goods.80 If there
were more than one producer of Starbucks coffee, for example,
consumers would no longer be confident that the Starbucks coffee
they purchased had the same distinct features as the Starbucks coffee
they had consumed in the past. The unauthorized use of the
Starbucks mark by another junior user is known as trademark
infringement. This infringement misleads the consumer to believing
that the junior user's product is manufactured by the senior user,
thereby devaluing the worth of the senior user's mark."'
In order to analyze an infringement claim, courts apply a likelihood-
of-confusion test," a standard that is viewed as the "linchpin" of
trademark infringement tests.83 This test measures the "likelihood
80. See, e.g., McLean v. Fleming, 96 U.S. 245, 251 (1877). The McLean Court
stated:
Suppose the [senior user] has obtained celebrity in his manufacture, he is
entitled to all the advantages of that celebrity, whether resulting from the
greater demand for his goods or from the higher price the public are willing
to give for the article, rather than for the goods of the other manufacturer,
whose reputation is not so high as a manufacturer. Where, therefore, a party
has been in the habit of stamping his goods with a particular mark or brand,
so that the purchasers of his goods having that mark or brand know them to
be of his manufacture, no other manufacturer has a right to adopt the same
stamp; because, by doing so, he would be substantially representing the
goods to be the manufacture of the person who first adopted the stamp, and
so would or might be depriving him of the profit he might make by the sale
of the goods which the purchaser intended to buy.
Id.
81. Examples of infringing uses of a mark include naming a restaurant
"McBagel's," see McDonald's Corp. v. McBagel's, Inc., 649 F. Supp. 1268, 1282
(S.D.N.Y. 1986) (enjoining use of the name "McBagel's" for a restaurant as likely to
produce confusion in possible sponsorship by McDonald's restaurant chain); using the
trademark Ms. Dior of Flatbush for a dry cleaning business, see Christian Dior,
S.A.R.L. v. Miss Dior of Flatbush, Inc., 173 U.S.P.Q. 416, 417 (E.D.N.Y. 1972);
unauthorized use of the Nike swoosh on sportswear, see Nike, Inc. v, "Just Did It"
Enters., 6 F.3d 1225, 1232-33 (7th Cir. 1993); and naming a heating and cooling
services corporation "Polaraid," see Polaroid Corp. v. Polaraid, Inc., 319 F.2d 830, 837
(7th Cir. 1963) (finding the public may incorrectly infer an affiliation with the camera
manufacturer).
82. See Lanham Act, Pub. L. No. 79-489, 60 Stat. 427 (1946) (codified as amended
at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127 (1994)), which provides relief for any use of a mark that is
"likely ... to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive" the public on the
source of the goods. The Restatement notes that: "The term 'likelihood of confusion'
has long been used to describe the standard of liability for trademark infringement in
actions at common law and under federal and state trademark and unfair competition
statutes." Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition § 20 cmt. d (1995); see also 3
McCarthy, supra note 3, § 23:1, at 23-6 to 23-7 & 23-6 n.1 (describing likelihood-of-
confusion as the "basic test of both common-law trademark infringement and federal
statutory trademark infringement" and citing numerous examples of cases using it to
determine infringement claims). But see James Burrough Ltd. v. Sign of Beefeater,
Inc., 540 F.2d 266, 274 (7th Cir. 1976) (noting that "people do not confuse
trademarks-trademarks confuse people" (quoting In re West Point-Pepperrell, Inc.,
468 F.2d 200 (C.C.P.A. 1972)).
83. See Matrix Essentials, Inc. v. Cosmetic Gallery, Inc. 870 F. Supp. 1237, 1251
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that an appreciable number of ordinarily prudent purchasers are likely
to be misled, or indeed simply confused, as to the source of the goods
in question."'  In assessing the public's likelihood of confusion, the
courts have developed a multi-factor test that considers:
the strength of [plaintiffs] mark, the degree of similarity between
the two marks, the proximity of the products, the likelihood that the
prior owner will bridge the gap, actual confusion, and the reciprocal
of defendant's good faith in adopting its own mark, the quality of
defendant's product, and the sophistication of the buyers.!
The likelihood-of-confusion test has prevented a grant of property
rights in gross to trademark owners by examining infringement strictly
from the perspective of the consumer rather than simply enjoining
each and every unauthorized use of the mark.' As a result, the test
focuses primarily on consumer confusion. Accordingly, a trademark
owner who is unable to demonstrate consumer confusion may not
prevent the unauthorized use, and subsequent weakening of a mark
through an infringement action.?
This focus on consumer confusion has caused courts to balance two
competing factors: prevention of public deception and encouragement
of marketplace competition. 8 Congress has echoed this dual-purpose
policy in trademark legislation:
The purpose underlying any trade-mark statute is twofold. One is to
protect the public so it may be confident that, in purchasing a
product bearing a particular trade-mark which it favorably knows, it
will get the product which it asks for and wants to get. Secondly,
where the owner of a trade-mark has spent energy, time, and money
in presenting to the public the product, he is protected in his
(D.N.J. 1994), affd, 85 F.3d 612 (3d Cir. 1996).
84. Mushroom Makers, Inc. v. R.G. Barry Corp., 580 F.2d 44, 47 (2d Cir. 1978)
(per curiam).
85. Polaroid Corp. v. Polarad Elecs. Corp., 287 F.2d 492, 495 (2d Cir. 1961).
86. See, e.g., McLean v. Fleming, 96 U.S. 245, 251 (1877) (finding that while it is
impossible to state the degree of resemblance in marks necessary to constitute an
infringement, this resemblance can be defined as one that would mislead the ordinary
purchaser).
87. At early common law, plaintiffs alleging trademark violations were provided
with a remedy in state unfair competition statutes for defendants who -passed off"
their goods as manufactured by the plaintiff and senior user. See I McCarthy, supra
note 3, § 1:12, at 1-27. Yet many courts refused to expand the doctrine of unfair
competition beyond actions that included copying labels and advertising, thus
precluding a remedy for dilution. Because dilution typically involves marks on
different products that would necessarily include different packaging, unfair
competition would not be found. See id.
8& See Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 767-68 (1992) (stating
that the purpose of the Lanham Act is to provide a remedy for deceptive uses of
marks and protect businesses from unfair competition); Park 'N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar
Park and Fly, Inc., 469 U.S. 189, 198 (1985) ("National protection of trademarks is
desirable ... because trademarks foster competition and the maintenance of quality
by securing to the producer the benefits of good reputation.").
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investment from its misappropriation by pirates and cheats.89
Congressional support for protection from trademark infringement
has been steadfast and effective.9° In 1946, Congress replaced the
Trademark Acts of 1905 and 1920 with the Trademark Act of 1946
(the "Lanham Act").91 The Lanham Act codified the common-law
likelihood-of-confusion standard and established an infringement
cause of action that incorporates non-competing goods.' This
valuable legislation provided trademark owners with strong and
effective statutory protection from infringement applied uniformly in
federal courts. Unfortunately, statutory protection for dilution claims,
as opposed to infringement claims, was not included in the original
Lanham Act. Thus, trademark owners turned to the courts for
acknowledgement of dilution as a viable theory and for protection
from its evils.
D. Dilution
1. Dilution Defined
Unlike traditional infringement claims, where a trademark owner
seeks protection from a competitor who uses a mark to confuse
customers into buying the junior product,93 dilution does not examine
a trademark violation from the perspective of the consumer.94 Rather,
"where the likelihood of confusion test leaves off, the dilution theory
begins."95 Dilution safeguards famous marks against junior use, even
89. See S. Rep. No. 79-1333 (1946), reprinted in 1946 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1274, 1274.
90. See id. at 1274-75 (stating that the Federal Trade-Mark Act, in place since
1905, has been amended often to make relief against infringement prompt and
effective).
91. Lanham Act, Pub. L. No. 79-489, 60 Stat. 427 (1946) (codified as amended at
15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127 (1994)).
92. The Act provides protection against any unauthorized use of a mark if that use
"is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive as to the affiliation,
connection, or association of such person with another person, or as to the origin,
sponsorship, or approval of his or her goods, services, or commercial activities by
another person...." 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(A)(1994). The Trademark Act of
February 20, 1905, provided relief only for "[ajny person who shall, without the
consent of the owner thereof, reproduce, counterfeit, copy, or colorably imitate any
such trademark and affix the same to merchandise of substantially the same
descriptive properties .... James Love Hopkins, The Law of Trademarks,
Tradenames and Unfair Competition 578b (4th ed. 1924) (quoting the Trademark Act
of February 20, 1905). As a result, the reformation of the Act provided relief even to
those uses by non-competitors, and provided courts with the likelihood-of-confusion
standard in measuring infringement.
93. See 4 McCarthy, supra note 3, § 24:1, at 24-6.
94. See, e.g., Wrench LLC v. Taco Bell Corp., 49 U.S.P.Q.2d 1032, 1035 (W.D.
Mich. 1998) ("The purpose of the [state anti-dilution] statute is to protect a mark
from damage to its value as a symbol rather than to prevent confusion between
products.").
95. 4 McCarthy, supra note 3, § 24:70, at 24-121.
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when there is no confusion as to the source of that junior use." "The
underlying rationale of the dilution doctrine is that a gradual
attenuation or whittling away of the value of a trademark, resulting
from use by another, constitutes an invasion of the senior user's
property right in its mark.... "'
In a recent case involving a dilution claim, a defendant attempted to
use the mark "Blockbuster" on its fireworks.9S In deciding the case,
the Eighth Circuit described the difference between infringement and
dilution:
To put the difference between infringement and dilution more
concretely, if a parent says to the kids, "Let's go pick something out
at Blockbuster tonight," and the youngest child assumes they will be
buying fireworks made by Viacom, that is evidence of the confusion
that is essential to a claim of trademark infringement. But if the
oldest child answers, "Which Blockbuster," that evidences dilution
by blurring. 9
9
Unauthorized use of a mark can therefore constitute both
infringement and dilution."°° In the mind of an individual, however,
only one of these violations can occur. "Either a person thinks that
the similarly branded goods or services come from a common
source.., or not. In that sense they are inconsistent states of
customer perception.' 0'1  Yet both perceptions are possible among
various members of the public as to any given mark.
While a finding of dilution necessarily precludes a finding of
infringement in the mind of a single consumer, it does not preclude a
finding of infringement in the mind of her neighbor. Dilution requires
a different type of mental association on the part of the public from
infringement. Rather than causing confusion, a customer, upon
viewing the junior mark, will mentally associate the junior mark with
the senior mark, but without confusing the two marks as emanating
from the same source. The customer is simply reminded of the senior
mark. Yet, even this mental association weakens the strength of the
senior mark because the association erodes its uniqueness."
Courts have typically been wary of recognizing the dilution doctrine
because dilution protection essentially expands the property rights of
a trademark owner. Instead of the protection of the mark being
96. See, e.g., Planet Hollywood (Region IV), Inc. v. Hollywood Casino Corp., No.
96 CIV. 4660, 1999 WL 1131887, at *67 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 3, 1999) (discussing the dilution
of the Planet Hollywood mark by Hollywood Casino).
97. 4 McCarthy, supra note 3, § 24:70, at 24-122.
98. See Viacom Inc. v. Ingram Enters., Inc., 141 F.3d 886,887-88 (8th Cir. 1998).
99. Id. at 891 n.9. For a discussion of dilution-by-blurring, see infra notes 107-12
and accompanying text.
100. See 4 McCarthy, supra note 3, § 24:70, at 24-122.
101. Id.
102. See id. (explaining that dilution is the gradual attenuation of the value of a
trademark).
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conditioned on safeguarding the public from consumer confusion, as
in an infringement claim, dilution protects the very ownership of the
mark and its consequent value. Dilution protection moves closer to a
grant of property rights in gross because such a grant could create a
monopoly on a mark's language and design to the detriment of
business and competition. 3 For example, should United Airlines be
able to enjoin a company from using the trademark "United Sugar?"
Under a property-rights-in-gross paradigm, the answer would be yes.
Despite the fact that the mark "United" is inherently weak," "United
Airlines" is sufficiently famous to have created secondary meaning in
its mark, thereby turning a weak mark into a strong mark and one
worthy of protection. Thus, under a property-rights-in-gross theory,
because any use of a mark sufficiently similar to a famous mark would
constitute dilution of that mark, United Airlines would be able to
enjoin the use of the mark "United Sugar." Courts are
understandably resistant to this grant of protection. In evaluating a
dilution claim under the paradigm that exists today, courts apply
factors that serve to limit dilution protection to a quasi-property right.
Traditionally, there are two different forms of a customer's mental
association that create dilution of a mark, "blurring" and
"tarnishment".0 5 The recent onset of the Internet Age has created an
additional type of dilution known as "cybersquatting.' 0 6
Blurring, the prototypical dilution claim, occurs when a junior
holder's use of a mark creates an association in the mind of the
consumer between the mark and the junior user's goods."°v While the
consumer recognizes that the senior user has not sponsored the
usually non-competing junior use of the mark, the strength of the
mark as a unique identifier of the senior holder's goods is nevertheless
eroded.0 8 Blurring would occur if, for example, the trademark
"Dupont" was used for shoes, "Buick" for aspirin, "Schlitz" for
varnish, or "Kodak" for pianos." 9 A trademark will "inevitably be
lost in the commonplace words of the language ... if it could
[simultaneously] be used on pianos, shaving cream, and fountain
pens.""'  The consumer's strong association of a mark with one
product is "blurred" because the mark's association is now shared
103. See, e.g., Viacom, 141 F.3d at 892 (holding that to grant plaintiff's dilution
claim would constitute monopoly on the use of language in commerce).
104. "Weak" marks are those that are relatively unknown or similar to other marks
or the name of the attached product or service. See 2 McCarthy, supra note 3, § 11:73,
at 11-129.
105. See id. § 24:67, at 24-119.
106. See id. § 24:69.1, at 24-121.
107. See id. § 24:68, at 24-120.
108. See H.R. Rep. No. 104-374, at 3 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1029,
1030.
109. See Sally Gee, Inc. v. Myra Hogan, Inc., 699 F.2d 621, 625 (2d Cir. 1983).
110. Schechter, Rational Basis, supra note 16, at 830.
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between two products. Blurring is usually decided through an
application of the factors set forth in Mead Data Central, Inc. v.
Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc."' The Mead Data factors comprise
the similarity of the marks, similarity of the products covered by the
marks, sophistication of consumers, predatory intent of the junior
user, renown of the senior mark, and renown of the junior mark.'12
Dilution-by-tarnishment occurs when the association created by the
junior holder's commercial use"' of the mark tarnishes, degrades, or
corrupts the senior holder's mark.114  Tarnishment often takes the
form of a parody on another's famous mark, such as a T-shirt bearing
the logo "Mutant of Omaha"" 5 or a red-and-white poster with script
identical to the Coca-Cola logo that reads "Enjoy Cocaine.-,"6 Courts
have found that these uses create an association between the two
marks in the mind of the consumer to the detriment of the senior
user.11 7 Where the senior user once enjoyed a wholesome and unique
association with the mark, it must now share that mark with an
unsavory and distasteful product or service, thus eroding the strength
of the senior mark.
To prove a dilution-by-tarnishment claim, a plaintiff must show
first, that the unauthorized use weakens the strength of the mark, and
second, that the weakness exists because of the junior user's
unwholesome, poor quality, or degrading use causing damage to the
senior user's creation of a positive image in the trademark."" The
strongest case of tarnishment occurs in pornographic uses, because
this type of violation "presents a special threat to the good name and
goodwill of the true owner."' 9 Courts are quick to enjoin the use of a
111. 875 F.2d 1026, 1035 (2d Cir. 1989) (Sweet, J., concurring). For a discussion of
the Mead Data factors, see infra notes 189-201 and accompanying text.
112- See Mead Data, 875 F.2d at 1035-40 (Sweet, J., concurring).
113. Non-commercial instances of tarnishment fall under the umbrella of the First
Amendment and are not actionable. See 4 McCarthy, supra note 3, § 24:105, at 24-206.
114. See Panavision Int'l, L.P. v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316, 1326 n.7 (9th Cir. 1998).
115. See Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co. v. Novak, 836 F.2d 397, 398 (8th Cir. 1987).
116. See Coca-Cola Co. v. Gemini Rising, Inc., 346 F. Supp. 1183, 1187 (E.D.N.Y.
1972). Tarnishment that is the result of editorial or artistic parody is not actionable
due to the rights afforded by the First Amendment, but the First Amendment
becomes less protective of parodies that identify a commercial product, such as
clothing. See 4 McCarthy, supra note 3, § 24:105, at 24-206.
117. See Hormel Foods Corp. v. Jim Henson Prods., Inc., 73 F.3d 497, 507 (2d Cir.
1996). Some forms of parody are protected. For example, the FTDA specifically
exempts noncommercial use of a mark. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(4)(B)(1995).
118. See Ameritech, Inc. v. American Info. Techs. Corp., 811 F.2d 960, 965 (6th Cir.
1987).
119. Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Pussycat Cinema Ltd., 467 F. Supp. 366,
374 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (enjoining the use of Dallas Cowboys Cheerleading costume in
the pornographic film Debbie Does Dallas), affd, 604 F.2d 200 (2d Cir. 1979). See,
e.g., Pillsbury Co. v. Milky Way Prods., Inc., 215 U.S.P.Q. 124, 136 (N.D. Ga. 1981)
(enjoining the use of the Poppin' Fresh trademark in pornographic film); Edgar Rice
Burroughs, Inc. v. Manns Theatres, 195 U.S.P.Q. 159, 161-62 (C.D. Cal. 1976)
(enjoining the use of Tarzan in a pornographic film).
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famous mark in this type of claim. For example, the Southern District
of New York enjoined the use of the Dallas Cowboy Cheerleaders'
costumes and persona in the pornographic film Debbie Does Dallas,
stating that it would be "hard to believe that anyone who had seen
defendants' sexually depraved film could ever thereafter disassociate
it from plaintiff's cheerleaders. This association results in... [injury
11'120to] 'plaintiff's business reputation ....
Cybersquatting is a more recent phenomenon recognized by the
Ninth Circuit in Panavision International L.P. v. Toeppen 2 1 as an
actionable type of dilution claim separate from tarnishment and
blurring. Cybersquatting occurs when someone registers a trademark
as a domain name for use on the Internet with the intention of
ransoming the Internet site back to the senior user for a price. 2 The
Ninth Circuit chose not to engage in legal contortions to find that
customers were confused when they typed in the senior user's mark
and instead brought up the junior user's site, or that they associated
the blank or unrelated site with the senior product.'2 Instead, the
court found that the strength of the mark was eroded by the
defendant's actions. While the junior user holds the Internet site, the
senior user may not fully capitalize on the mark by using it as a
domain address, but must rely on a cumbersome search engine to gain
customer access.124  The court noted that "potential customers of
Panavision will be discouraged if they cannot find its web page by
typing in 'Panavision.com,' but instead are forced to wade through
hundreds of web sites. This dilutes the value of Panavision's
trademark."'" Thus, the court created a third form of dilution,
holding that "[t]o find dilution, a court need not rely on the traditional
definitions such as 'blurring' and 'tarnishment. ' '"1 26 Instead, the court
determined that dilution automatically occurred when the defendant's
actions "diminished the capacity of the Panavision marks to identify
and distinguish Panavision's goods and services on the Internet.' 127
On November 29, 1999, Congress codified the Ninth Circuit's
findings by passing the Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act
(the "Anticybersquatting Act")," which amended the Lanham Act to
120. Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, 604 F.2d at 205 (citation omitted).
121. 141 F.3d 1316 (9th Cir. 1998).
122. See 4 McCarthy, supra note 3, § 24:69.1, at 24-121.
123. See Panavision, 141 F.3d at 1326-27. Search engines, such as Yahoo!, Lycos,
and Excite, locate Web sites by using key word searches. See Jennifer Golinveaux,
What's in a Domain Name: Is "Cybersquatting" Trademark Dilution?, 33 U.S.F. L.
Rev. 641, 643 (1999).
124. See Panavision, 141 F.3d at 1325.
125. Id. at 1327.
126. Id. at 1326.
127. Id. (quotations omitted).
128. See Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 106-113, 113
Stat. 1537 (1999) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1999)). For a
discussion of the Anticybersquatting Act, see infra Part II.
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include a federal remedy for various trademark violations caused by
cybersquatting. By requiring a showing of bad faith by the defendant,
the Anticybersquatting Act excludes from prosecution those innocent
registrants who either unintentionally registered a trademark or had
no intention of profiting from the goodwill of the mark.129 Rather, the
Act allows trademark owners a federal remedy for the damage done
to their marks by registrants who intend to profit from use of the
senior mark as a domain name by selling it to the senior user.
2. Development of the Dilution Cause of Action
Recognition of dilution began in the early 1900s, when courts and
legal theorists noticed an increase in "trademark piracy."',
Companies began using famous trademarks to attract consumer
interest in their own non-competing products. For example, junior
producers used famous trade names such as Kodak to market
bicycles,' Rolls-Royce to sell radio parts,3 2 and Beech-Nut to market
cigarettes. 133 In most instances, the consumer would recognize that
the senior user had not sponsored the mark, thereby precluding a
finding of confusion. But because the consumer would still connect
the junior mark with the senior mark, the senior mark's uniqueness
and strength was eroded."M Nevertheless, courts felt that this "piracy"
was a type of unfair competition, and would often enjoin continued
use of the mark by finding a likelihood-of-confusion when in fact none
existed. 35
In 1927, Professor Frank Schechter addressed these types of
trademark violations in his seminal article The Rational Basis of
Trademark Protection.'36 Professor Schechter pointed out that certain
trademark uses on non-competing goods did not trigger confusion in
the minds of consumers, but nevertheless constituted a wrong against
129. See 15 U.S.C § 1125(d)(1)(B)(1999).
130. Schechter, Rational Basis, supra note 16, at 825 (noting that i[tlrademark
pirates are growing more subtle and refined").
131. See Eastman Photographic Materials Co. v. Kodak Cycle Co., 15 Rep. Pat.
Cas. 105,105 (1898).
132. See Wall v. Rolls-Royce of Am., Inc., 4 F.2d 333,333 (3d Cir. 1925).
133. See Beech-Nut Packing Co. v. P. Lorillard Co., 7 F.2d 967, 968 (3d Cir. 1925),
affd, 273 U.S. 629 (1927).
134. See 4 McCarthy, supra note 3, § 24.70, at 24-122 ("The underlying rationale of
the dilution doctrine is that a gradual attenuation ... of the value of a trademark ...
constitutes an invasion of the senior user's property right in its mark ...."); Steven B.
Pokotilow & Heather L. Danzig, Whittling Away at Dilution: Attorneys, Courts
Mistake "Confusion"for "Blurring", N.Y. LJ. (Intell. Prop. Insert), Oct. 18, 1999, at
1.
135. See, eg., Rolls-Royce, 4 F.2d at 334 (holding that a consumer could mistakenly
assume that Rolls-Royce had begun producing radio tubes because both cars and
radio tubes use electricity). But see Beech-Nut, 7 F.2d at 970 (denying injunctive relief
to the senior holder of the mark because food and tobacco are unrelated categories of
goods).
136. See Schechter, Rational Basis, supra note 16, at 830.
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the trademark owner. 37  Schechter contended that dilution, "the
gradual whittling away or dispersion of the identity and hold upon the
public mind of the mark or name by its use upon non-competing
goods, 38 is just as harmful as infringement. 13 9 Schechter argued that
failing to enjoin such dilution was akin to allowing infringement
because a diluted trademark "gradually but surely loses its
effectiveness and unique distinctiveness,"'140 thereby eroding the
goodwill and capital a company has invested in a trademark.
Unfortunately, Schechter's theory met with resistance. 141  Critics
feared monopoly by trademark owners and a dampening of
competition,42 and as a result, formal relief incubated for decades.4
A proposal drafted by Schechter to amend existing federal trademark
law to include dilution was introduced in 1932 and rejected by
Congress. 44 Meanwhile, trademark violations that were tantamount
to dilution continued to be incorrectly analyzed under infringement
standards. 45 Because of an absence of consumer confusion in these
violations, 46 courts would often deny relief. 47
137. See id. at 825 ("[W]e have intimated the possibility that the use of trademarks
on entirely non-related goods may of itself concretely injure the owner of the mark
even in the absence of [confusion].").
138. Id. Despite his reputation as the father of the American dilution doctrine,
Schechter did not coin the term "dilution." Rather, it was reportedly first used in a
German case that found that a steel manufacturer using the mark "Odol" constituted
dilution (verwassert) of the more senior mouthwash manufacturer. See Rose, supra
note 33, at 658 n.19.
139. See Schechter, Rational Basis, supra note 16, at 825 ("The history of important
trademark litigation within recent years shows that the use of similar marks on non-
competing goods is perhaps the normal rather than the exceptional case of
infringement." (emphasis in original)).
140. Id. at 830.
141. See Robert N. Klieger, Trademark Dilution: The Whittling Away of the
Rational Basis for Trademark Protection, 58 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 789, 802-10 (1997).
142. See Schechter, Rational Basis, supra note 16, at 833.
143. See Patrick M. Bible, Comment, Defining and Quantifying Dilution Under the
Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995: Using Survey Evidence to Show Actual
Dilution, 70 U. Colo. L. Rev. 295, 300 (1999) (noting that after Professor Schechter's
1927 article, twenty years passed before the first state adopted an anti-dilution
statute).
144. See Susan L. Serad, One Year After Dilution's Entry Into Federal Trademark
Law, 32 Wake Forest L. Rev. 215, 217 (1997) (citing H.R. 11,592, 72d Cong. (1932)).
145. For a discussion of infringement standards, see supra Part I.C.
146. See Yale Elec. Corp. v. Robertson, 26 F.2d 972, 973-74 (2d Cir. 1928) ("What
harm did it do to a chewing gum maker to have an ironmonger use his trademark?...
However, it has of recent years been recognized that a merchant may have a sufficient
economic interest in the use of his mark outside the field of his own exploitation to
justify interposition by a court."). Despite Judge Hand's prophetic description of
dilution, the case was decided under infringement standards by noting that many
consumers had mistaken the junior user's products as emanating from the senior user.
See id. at 973. As a result, a remedy for dilution remained dormant. See also L.E.
Waterman Co. v. Gordon, 72 F.2d 272, 273 (2d Cir. 1934) (finding that defendant's
use of trademark "Waterman" for razor blades infringed plaintiff's trademark in the
manufacture of pens); Del Monte Special Food Co. v. California Packing Corp., 34
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Dilution recognition began gaining momentum in 1947 when
Massachusetts passed the first anti-dilution statute."" The
commencement of modern dilution enforcement, however, occurred
in 1964 when the United States Trademark Association (the "USTA")
amended the Model State Trademark Bill to reflect dilution
protections.149 The language of the bill provided that:
[l]ikelihood of injury to business reputation or of dilution of the
distinctive quality of a mark registered under this Act, or a mark
valid at common law.., shall be a ground for injunctive relief
notwithstanding the absence of competition between parties or the
absence of confusion as to the source of goods or services. "
The explicit statement that injunctive relief would be provided for
dilution even in the absence of consumer confusion affirmed the
traditional concept of a dilution claim.' Moreover, the USTA's
acceptance of the dilution doctrine encouraged other states to pass
anti-dilution statutes.1 2 To date, over half of the states have enacted
such statutes, 3 and several additional state courts have recognized
dilution as a cause of action.'54
In 1957, the First Circuit became one of the first courts to uphold a
state anti-dilution statute in Esquire, Inc. v. Esquire Slipper
Manufacturing Co., Inc.151 In deciding allegations by Esquire
Magazine of both infringement and dilution of its famous mark by a
slipper manufacturer, the First Circuit legitimized dilution as a
remediable form of relief by explicitly supporting the dilution doctrine
as a separate claim from infringement, even absent customer
F.2d 774,777 (9th Cir. 1929) (enjoining use of "Del Monte" on margarine, despite the
fact that plaintiff did not manufacture or distribute margarine); Alfred Dunhill of
London, Inc. v. Dunhill Shirt Shop, Inc., 3 F. Supp. 487, 487 (S.D.N.Y. 1929) (finding
that the only motive for defendant to choose the name "Dunhill" for its shirts was to
trade on the goodwill established by plaintiff in its manufacture of cigarettes);
Philadelphia Storage Battery Co. v. Mindlin, 296 N.Y.S. 176, 180-81 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1937) (enjoining as infringing the use of the trademark "Philco," a famous
manufacturer of radio sets, for marketing razor blades).
147. See Arrow Distilleries, Inc. v. Globe Brewing Co., 117 F.2d 347, 351 (4th Cir.
1941) (finding that because the products were in two different classes, there was no
infringement of the shared "Arrow" mark).
148. See Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 110B, § 12 (Law. Co-op 1995).
149. See Mahaffey-Dowd, supra note 16, at 430.
150. See Model State Trademark Bill § 12 (reprinted in 3 McCarthy, supra note 3, §
22:8, at 22-22 (emphasis added).
151. See id.
152. See Mahaffey-Dowd, supra note 16, at 430.
153. See Oswald, supra note 16, at 266.
154. See id at 266 n.59 ("Dilution claims ... are cognizable under Ohio's common
law." (citing Ameritech, Inc. v. American Info. Technologies Corp., 811 F2d 960, 965
(6th Cir. 1987)); Hartford House Ltd. v. Hallmark Cards Inc.. 647 F. Supp. 1533, 1541-
42 (D. Colo. 1986) (applying Colorado common law), affd, 846 F.2d 1268 (10th Cir.
1988).
155. 243 F.2d 540, 542 (1st Cir. 1957).
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confusion.5 6 The court defined dilution as a trademark violation
between non-competing parties, 57 and recognized that a plaintiff may
simultaneously bring both infringement and dilution claims.5 8
Ultimately, the First Circuit denied both claims in that case, finding
that the weakness of the senior mark combined with the dissimilarity
between the junior and senior marks did not afford protection of the
senior mark.5 9
In 1963, the Seventh Circuit also upheld a state anti-dilution statute
in Polaroid Corp. v. Polaraid, Inc.'" The famous camera
manufacturer sued a heating and refrigeration contractor for
infringement, dilution, and unfair competition violations, yet both the
trial court and the plaintiff conceded an absence of customer
confusion.161  Accordingly, the Seventh Circuit granted injunctive
relief on the dilution and unfair competition claims alone, recognizing
that a dilution injury "differs materially from that arising out of the
orthodox confusion .... Such confusion leads to immediate injury,
while dilution is an infection which, if allowed to spread, will
inevitably destroy the advertising value of the mark."6 The court
discerned that dilution is a substantially different action from
infringement, requiring not consumer confusion, but rather a
continuous, eroding use of the plaintiffs mark. 63  The court
acknowledged that while there was no reported dilution case law to
aid in deciding the merits of the dilution claim, the "plain,
unambiguous language" of the statute "lays a heavy hand upon one
who adopts the trade name or mark of another.'" "4
By setting forth a standard for analyzing dilution claims absent
consumer confusion, the Seventh Circuit both strengthened the
precedent available to other courts deciding dilution claims' 65 and
issued a clear warning to potential trademark dilutionists. Indeed,
courts began recognizing that allowing defendants' unauthorized use
of a mark created a "risk of an erosion of the public's identification of
156. See id.
157. See id. ("This is obviously a dilution case, for clearly the parties are not
directly competing with one another in the sale of similar goods."). Absence of
competition, however, is no longer required in a dilution claim. See 4 McCarthy, supra
note 3, § 24:72, at 24-128 to 24-129.
158. See Esquire, 243 F.2d at 542.
159. See id. at 544-45.
160. 319 F.2d 830, 837 (7th Cir. 1963).
161. See id. at 835.
162. Id. at 836 (quoting 3 Rudolf Callmann, The Law of Unfair Competition and
Trademarks, § 84.2, at 1643 (2d ed. 1950)).
163. See id., 319 F.2d at 836 (quoting 3 Rudolf Callmann, The Law of Unfair
Competition and Trade-marks, § 84.2, at 1643 (2d ed. 1950)).
164. Id.
165. See, e.g., Hyatt Corp. v. Hyatt Legal Servs., 736 F.2d 1153, 1157 (7th Cir. 1984)
(discussing Polaroid); Intermatic, Inc. v. Toeppen, 947 F. Supp. 1227, 1236 (N.D. I11.
1996) (same); Instrumentalist Co. v. Marine Corps League, 509 F. Supp. 323, 331-32
(N.D. I1l. 1981) (same), affd, 694 F.2d 145 (7th Cir. 1982).
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[a] very strong mark with the plaintiff alone, thus diminishing its
distinctiveness, uniqueness, effectiveness, and prestigious
connotations...."166
Each subsequent successful dilution claim, while seemingly less and
less revolutionary, represented tremendous inroads into the
traditional view of trademarks as mere quasi-property rights that must
rely on a consumer confusion standard for protection.'3 Each court
that recognized dilution implicitly acknowledged the statutory decree
that trademark owners deserve protection for the goodwill and
investment made in their marks, even absent a transgression against
the public. Dilution theories expand the protection afforded because
dilution relies on a different standard from trademark infringement.
The recognition of dilution as a viable cause of action thus
demonstrated that a consumer's mental association, in the absence of
confusion, can also create an injury against which trademark law
attempts to protect.
In contrast, other courts have refused to acknowledge dilution
claims absent a showing of customer confusion, despite clear statutory
language to the contrary. 68 For example, in Cue Publishing Co., Inc.
v. Colgate-Palmolive Co.,169 a New York state court held that '[it
would appear therefore, and the cases have so held, that to give effect
to the dilution doctrine some measure of confusion must be present
and in those cases where it was found to exist the rights of the senior
user were upheld.""17 Similarly, a New York federal court held in
Geisel v. Poynter Products, InC.171 that New York's anti-dilution
statute required a showing of customer confusion," while in Holiday
Inns, Inc. v. Holiday Out in America,"7 the Fifth Circuit refused to
find that a defendant's mark used in connection with its campgrounds
constituted a dilution of the nationally recognized Holiday Inn hotel
chain. 4 While the court in Holiday Inns recognized that dilution is
166. Tiffany & Co. v. Boston Club, Inc., 231 F. Supp. 836,844 (D. Mass. 1964).
167. See Lunney, supra note 38, at 393.
168. See, for example, N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 368-d (McKinney 1961), which states
that:
Likelihood of injury to business reputation or of dilution of the distinctive
quality of a mark or trade name shall be a ground for injunctive relief in
cases of infringement of a mark registered or not registered or in cases of
unfair competition, notwithstanding the absence of competition between the
parties or the absence of confiision as to the source of goods or services.
Id. (emphasis added).
169. 256 N.Y.S.2d 239, 245 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1965) (holding that Cue toothpaste did
not dilute Cue magazine because the plaintiff had not shown either consumer
confusion or that the mark had achieved the secondary meaning necessary to sustain a
right to relief), affd, 259 N.Y.S.2d 377 (1st Dep't 1965).
170. Id. (citations omitted).
171. 295 F. Supp. 331 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
172. See id. at 355.
173. 481 F.2d 445 (5th Cir. 1973).
174. See id at 450.
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appropriate in cases where there is no likelihood of confusion, it
stated that in this case, dilution was not appropriate because the
marks were not "confusing.' ' 7
This latter finding has caused a flurry of law review and journal
articles condemning the court's application of the likelihood-of-
confusion standard to a dilution claim. 7 6 But in fact, while the court
appeared to impose infringement standards by using the term
"confusing" in its dilution analysis, it was merely discussing the
similarity of the marks. 7 Thus, when the court stated that the marks
were "not confusing," it meant that they were "dissimilar." After
finding that the plaintiffs mark "Holiday Inn" was sufficiently
dissimilar from defendant's "Holiday Out in America," and thus not
confusing, the court applied the finding to the allegation of dilution.7 8
The court properly noted that:
Dilution is a concept most applicable where a subsequent user uses
the trademark of a prior user for a product so dissimilar from the
product of the prior user that there is no likelihood of confusion...
but where the use of the trademark by the subsequent user will
lessen the uniqueness of the prior user's mark with the possible
future result that a strong mark may become a weak mark.179
In finding that dilution was not applicable because the marks were
not similar, 8 ' the court tacitly determined that the dissimilarity of the
marks would therefore fail to trigger the mental association in the
mind of the consumer between the junior and senior mark necessary
to dilute the senior user's mark.18'
The Fifth Circuit's imprecise reasoning is typical of the burden
under which dilution claims labor. Courts frequently decide dilution
claims using the language of infringement standards, resulting in a
miscommunication of the court's analysis of the law."8 The word
175. Id.
176. See, e.g., Lunney, supra note 38, at 409 n.161 (describing Holiday Inns as
requiring likelihood of confusion in a dilution case); James Robert Hughes,
Comment, The Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995 and the Evolution of the
Dilution Doctrine-Is it Truly a Rational Basis for the Protection of Trademarks?,
1998 Det. C.L. Mich. St. U.L. Rev. 759, 765 (1998) (stating that the Fifth Circuit
denied plaintiff's dilution claim in Holiday Inns because of lack of confusion); Terry
R. Bowen, The Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995-Does it Address the Dilution
Doctrine's Most Serious Problems?, 7 DePaul-LCA J. Art & Ent. L. 75, 78 n.17 (1996)
(same).
177. See Holiday Inns, 481 F.2d at 449.
178. See id. at 450.
179. Id.
180. See id. at 448 ("The trial court correctly found that the manner of advertising
and use of the defendants' marks would not be likely to cause a prospective customer
to conclude that the defendants were in any way affiliated or connected with
plaintiff.").
181. For a discussion on the mental association component of a dilution claim, see
supra Part I.D.1.
182. See, e.g., Holiday Inns, 481 F.2d at 450; supra notes 173-80 and accompanying
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"confusion" has become a term of art in trademark law, affiliated
specifically with a finding of infringement.113 To use the term in any
other analysis diminishes the clarity of the court's reasoning and
misleads the audience. Yet courts are so comfortable with the use of
the term in trademark cases, that another term, such as "dissimilar,"
"mistaken," "misconstrued," or "misunderstood," is rarely used.
Hence, courts unfortunately continue to use "confusion" to describe a
consumer's mental association between marks, even when consumer
confusion does not exist and even if the court has otherwise properly
analyzed the claim. Such imprecise language contributes to the
misapplication of dilution law because it sets a precedent that
seemingly imparts an infringement analysis in a dilution standard,
thereby encouraging other courts to misapply that erroneous
precedent.
Further support for dilution claims and clarification of its
underlying rationale was advanced in Mead Data Central, Inc. v.
Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc.1" in 1989, in which the concurrence
formulated the standard for a dilution-by-blurring analysis that
virtually all courts hearing blurring claims have since adopted.Y5
While dilution-by-tarnishment claims are easily detectable by courts
because they involve a commercial use of the senior mark that
damages the senior user's reputation,"s dilution-by-blurring is harder
to demonstrate, as it consists of an erosion of the strength of the mark,
but without a corresponding event that courts can point toward as a
linchpin817 similar to infringement's likelihood-of-confusion test."°
The Mead Data factors thus gave the courts the tools, albeit faulty
ones, with which to identify and analyze a dilution-by-blurring claim.
In Mead Data, plaintiff-owner of the Lexis-Nexis legal database
text.
183. See 3 McCarthy, supra note 3, § 23:1, at 23-6 (describing likelihood-of-
confusion as the basic test for common-law and federal trademark infringement).
184. 875 F.2d 1026 (2d Cir. 1989); see also Allied Maintenance Corp. v. Allied
Mechanical Trades, Inc., 42 N.Y.2d 538, 544 (1977). The court there found that:
Notwithstanding the absence of judicial enthusiasm for the anti-dilution
statutes, we believe that [the New York dilution statute] does extend the
protection afforded trade-marks and trade names beyond that provided by
actions for infringement and unfair competition [as] [t]he evil which the
Legislature sought to remedy was not public confusion caused by similar
products or services sold by competitors, but a cancer-like growth of
dissimilar products or services which feeds upon the business reputation of
an established distinctive trade-mark or name.
Id.
185. See Oswald, supra note 16, at 285 ("Every court to date to have decided a
blurring case under the federal Act has applied these factors.").
186. For a discussion of dilution-by-tarnishment claims, see supra Part I.D.1.
187. See Mead Data, 875 F.2d at 1035 (stating that a "blurred" mark is only slightly
more illustrative of a wrong than "dilution").
188. For a discussion of infringement and the likelihood-of-confusion test, see
supra Part I.C.
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sued defendant Toyota, owner of the Lexus line of automobiles, under
a state-based dilution claim. 189 The court emphasized the importance
of following the legislative intent behind the state anti-dilution statute
by providing a remedy for unauthorized use of a mark absent
confusion in the minds of the public.90 Moreover, the majority
accurately defined dilution as requiring "some mental association
between [the] marks .... [D]ilution theory presumes some kind of
mental association in the reasonable buyer's mind between the two
[parties'] uses of the mark."191 The court found for the defendant,
however, holding that the differences in spelling and pronunciation
were sufficient to prevent the requisite mental association in the
minds of the public between the two marks.192
Judge Sweet concurred, but disagreed with the court's analysis of
the claim, 193 which focused on the assessment of the mental
association between the marks.94 Judge Sweet pointed out that a
multi-factor balancing test is most appropriate in blurring claims,
which require a case-by-case analysis rather than a blanket prohibition
against the use of a mark. 95 He proposed balancing certain relevant
elements that are now known as the "Mead Data factors":
Similarity of the marks;
Similarity of the products covered by the marks;
Sophistication of consumers;
Predatory intent;
Renown of the senior mark; and
Renown of the junior mark. 96
The Mead Data factors set forth in Judge Sweet's concurrence
examine the technical aspects of dilution, such as the similarity of the
marks, the similarity of the products, and the fame of each of the
marks.'97 However, only two of the factors even implicitly evaluate
the mental association made by the consumer between the two marks
as relied on by the majority. 98  In setting forth these mental
association factors, Judge Sweet first examined the sophistication of
189. See Mead Data, 875 F.2d at 1028.
190. See id. at 1028-29.
191. Id. at 1031 (emphasis in original) (citation omitted).
192. See id. at 1029.
193. See id. at 1032-33 (Sweet, J., concurring).
194. See id. at 1031.
195. See id. at 1035 (Sweet, J., concurring). Judge Sweet may have feared a grant
of a property-right-in-gross to the owner. For a discussion of the property rights in
trademarks, see supra Part I.B.
196. See Mead Data, 875 F.2d at 1035-40 (Sweet, J., concurring).
197. See id.
198. While Judge Sweet does not create a separate factor to assess the mental
association necessary to a dilution claim, he alludes to such an assessment in his
discussion of the factor evaluating renown of the senior mark, in which he discusses
the extent to which the renown of the senior mark affects the mental association
consumers make between the two marks. See id. at 1038.
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the consumer to determine whether a consumer can understand that
the marks emanate from two different sources and whether a
connection between the two marks is made.' Second, Judge Sweet
assessed the predatory intent of the junior user, asking whether the
junior user chose the mark with the intention of capitalizing on the
mental association a consumer makes between the marks.2'
Each of the remaining factors, on the other hand, examines merely
the technical aspects of the trademark. Additionally, four of these
universally applied factors-similarity of the products, sophistication
of consumers, predatory intent, and renown of the junior mark-
incorporate a likelihood-of-confusion standard into dilution claims by
duplicating four of the factors applied to an infringement claim?"~'
While certain of these four factors have relevance in a dilution claim,
they must be considered in light of the dilution standard, and in
conjunction with other factors appropriate to dilution.2  Indeed,
Judge Sweet proposed the Mead Data factors in light of the majority's
finding, which focuses on a finding of a mental association between
the two marks.
Yet, the most important factor in determining a dilution claim,
recognized and emphasized in the majority opiniono 3-' the mental
association made between the two marks-is not incorporated into
Judge Sweet's enumeration of factors. Nor are the factors themselves
based on a measurement of true dilution. Rather than individually
examining whether each factor actually applies in a dilution analysis,
Judge Sweet simply culled the various factors used by courts in the
Second Circuit in prior dilution decisions.' ° Additionally, because
many courts have adopted this incomplete analysis, most opinions
ignore the necessary measurement of the erosion in the strength of the
mark by explicitly assessing the mental association between the
marks. Thus, while courts are gradually affording protection from
dilution, the nearly ubiquitous use of an incomplete analysis has
caused dilution-by-blurring to remain a weak measure of protection
for trademark owners.
Despite its shortcomings, the act of creating a dilution standard,
although one nearly identical to an infringement model,216 marks an
199. See id. at 1036-37.
200. See id. at 1037-38.
201. See Oswald, supra note 16, at 295-97. For a discussion of the likelihood-of-
confusion standard, see supra Part I.C. The two additional factors used to evaluate an
infringement claim are: 1) actual confusion; and 2) will the gap be bridged? See
Polaroid Corp. v. Polarad Elecs. Corp., 287 F.2d 492, 495 (2d Cir. 1961). For a
discussion of the Polaroid factors, see supra note 85 and accompanying text.
202. For a discussion of the factors applicable to a dilution claim, see infra Part IV.
203. See Mead Data, 875 F.2d at 1031.
204. See id. at 1032-35 (Sweet, J., concurring).
205. For a discussion of infringement and the factors used to evaluate an
infringement claim, see supra Part I.C.
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important milestone in the recognition of trademark dilution. Mead
Data acknowledged the lack of guidance provided to courts and
practitioners in defining a dilution-by-blurring claim, and attempted to
create the elements of a blurring cause of action. However, the
guidance Judge Sweet attempted to forge potentially caused even
more problems for dilution theory. Instead, a standard incorporating
both the majority's focus on a required mental association and certain
of Judge Sweet's factors would provide courts and practitioners with a
far more useful tool in assessing a dilution-by-blurring claim than the
current standard.20 6
Regardless of the Mead Data factors' shortcomings, it encouraged
courts to analyze dilution, and particularly dilution-by-blurring, as a
claim separate from infringement, and avoided using the likelihood-
of-confusion standard.2° Yet, by 1996 only sixteen cases had been
decided on dilution standards alone,28 and many dilution violations
continued to be decided under or in conjunction with traditional
infringement standards. Dilution thus had yet to emerge as a viable
separate remedy, and remained in the shadow of trademark
infringement. The next part describes the enactment of the Federal
Trademark Dilution and Anticybersquatting Acts, passed in response
to the difficulties experienced by trademark owners in forging both
traditional claims of dilution of a famous mark by blurring or
tarnishment, and more recently, of dilution-by-cybersquatting.
II. THE FEDERAL TRADEMARK DILUTION ACT AND THE
ANTICYBERSQUATrING CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT OF 1999
Uneven application of dilution standards and the inconsistent
availability of state anti-dilution statutes led to several problems,
206. For a proposal advocating an incorporation of the majority opinion in Mead
Data with certain of the Mead Data factors, see infra Part IV.
207. See, e.g., Hyatt Corp. v. Hyatt Legal Servs., 736 F.2d 1153, 1157 (7th Cir. 1984)
(holding that consumer confusion was not necessary to a claim of dilution).
208. See Klieger, supra note 141, at 820 n.174 (citing Deere & Co. v. MTD Prods.,
Inc., 41 F.3d 39, 45 (2d Cir. 1994); Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows,
Inc. v. Celozzi-Ettelson Chevrolet, Inc., 855 F.2d 480, 485 (7th Cir. 1988); Hyatt Corp.,
736 F.2d at 1158; Community Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Orondorff, 678 F.2d 1034,
1037 (11th Cir. 1982); Eventide Inc. v. DOD Elecs. Corp., No. 93 CIV. 2713(SS), 1995
WL 239044, at *18 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 24, 1995); McDonald's Corp. v. Arche Techs., 17
U.S.P.Q.2d 1557, 1560 (N.D. Cal. 1990); Hester Indus. Inc. v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 16
U.S.P.Q.2d 1275, 1280 (N.D.N.Y. 1990); Coca-Cola Co. v. Alma-Leo U.S.A., Inc., 719
F. Supp. 725, 729 (N.D. Ill. 1989); Eastman Kodak Co. v. D.B. Rakow, 739 F. Supp.
116, 120 (W.D.N.Y. 1989); American Express Co. v. Vibra Approved Labs. Corp., 10
U.S.P.Q.2d 2006, 2013 (S.D.N.Y. 1989); Sykes Lab., Inc. v. Kalvin, 610 F. Supp. 849,
858 (C.D. Cal. 1985); Estee Lauder, Inc. v. Cinnabar 2000 Haircutters, Inc., 218
U.S.P.Q. 191, 192 (S.D.N.Y. 1982), affd, 714 F.2d 112 (2d Cir. 1982); Pillsbury Co. v.
Milky Way Prods., Inc., 215 U.S.P.Q. 124, 135 (N.D. Ga. 1981); Instrumentalist Co. v.
Marine Corps League, 509 F. Supp. 323, 333 (N.D. I11. 1981), afj'd, 694 F.2d 145 (7th
Cir. 1982); Dawn v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 319 F. Supp. 358, 363 (C.D. Cal. 1970);
Wedgwood Homes, Inc. v. Lund, 659 P.2d 377,383 (Or. 1983)).
1854 [Vol. 68
DILUTION-BY-BLURRING
including forum shopping.2°  Even when a dilution remedy was
available and properly issued, the fate of injunctions was uncertain in
jurisdictions that did not recognize dilution claims, making judges
reluctant to issue nationwide injunctions based on state law.210 Lack
of nationwide relief for a trademark violation was increasingly
important to those trademark owners with multi-state markets.
Seeking injunctive relief in all fifty states would be incredibly
burdensome, and probably impossible, for such owners. Finally, lack
of federal dilution relief damaged negotiations conducted by the
United States in forging the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
("GATT").21 1 Foreign countries used the lack of federal dilution
relief available in the United States as an excuse for their own lack of
intellectual property protection in other areas, thus frustrating
agreement among the nations.2 '2
As a result, in 1988 the United States Trademark Association
("USTA") and Senators DeConcini and Hatch proposed to include in
the Trademark Law Revision Act,213 an amendment to the Lanham
Act, federal relief for dilution claims. 214 The President of the USTA
testified before the Senate that modern commercial realities
mandated amending the Lanham Act to include, among other things,
a federal remedy for dilution claims. 215 Thus, the proposed act aimed
to protect "federally-registered marks that are truly famous from uses
that trade upon their goodwill and exceptional renown and dilute
their distinctive quality. '216  The 1988 proposal was struck down,
however, largely due to free speech concerns, as the proposed act did
not exempt those non-commercial or media uses that may otherwise
constitute a dilution claim.217
In 1995, the concerns that led to the failure of the proposed 1988 act
were readdressed by the Federal Trademark Dilution Act. As
incorporated into the Lanham Act in 1995,211 the language of the Act
209. See The United States Trademark Ass'n, The Trademark Law Revision Act of
1988,333 (1989); H.R. Rep. No. 104-374, at 3-4 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N.
1029,1030-31.
210. See id. at 3-4, reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1030-31.
211. See The United States Trademark Ass'n, The Trademark Law Revision Act of
1988 334 (1989).
212. See id.
213. See Trademark Law Revision Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-667, 102 Stat. 3935.
214. See The United States Trademark Ass'n, The Trademark Law Revision Act of
1988 333 (1989).
215. See id. at 228.
216. Id at 243.
217. See id at 242; Elliot B. Staffin, The Dilution Doctrine: Towards a
Reconciliation with the Lanhain Act, 6 Fordham Intell. Prop. Media & Ent. LJ. 105,
150 (1995).
218. See Remarks of the Honorable Carlos J. Moorhead Before tile Patent and
Trademark Office Society, 78 J. Pat. & Trademark Off. Soc'y 225, 226-27 (1996).
Senator Moorhead testified that:
Presently, the nature and extent of the remedies against trademark dilution
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is similar to the Model State Trademark Bill, which in turn tracks the
language of most state anti-dilution statutes.2 19 The Act provides that:
The owner of a famous mark shall be entitled, subject to the
principles of equity and upon such terms as the court deems
reasonable, to an injunction against another person's commercial
use in commerce of a mark or trade name, if such use begins after
the mark has become famous and causes dilution of the distinctive
quality of the mark .... 220
The Act adopted the common law definition of dilution as "the
lessening of the capacity of a famous mark to identify and distinguish
goods or services, regardless of the presence or absence of - 1)
competition between the owner of the famous mark and other parties,
or 2) likelihood of confusion, mistake, or deception. ' 21  The
legislative history of the Act also clarified the drafters' intent by
stating that relief was available only to famous marks, even absent
competition, and most importantly, absent consumer confusion. The
House Report stated: "Dilution does not rely upon the standard test
of infringement, that is, likelihood of confusion, deception or mistake.
Rather, it applies when the unauthorized use of a famous mark
reduces the public's perception that the mark signifies something
unique, singular, or particular."'2
The Act responded to restrictionist concerns by limiting dilution
relief to only the most famous of marks. '  Notably, trademarks are
not referred to as property in the FFDA,z4 suggesting that Congress
did not intend to confer full property rights on trademark owners.
varies from state to state and, therefore, can provide unpredictable and
inadequate results for the trademark owner. The federal remedy provided
in [the FTDA] against trademark dilution will bring uniformity and
consistency to the protection of famous marks and is also consistent with our
international obligations in the trademark area.
Id. But see Pollack, supra note 62, at 522-24 (questioning the effectiveness of a
dilution statute in addressing the United States's international trading positions and
uneven application of state dilution laws).
219. See Melanie M. Routh, Note, Trademark Dilution and the Effect of the Federal
Trademark Dilution Act, 50 Rutgers L. Rev. 253,261 (1997).
220. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1) (Supp. IV 1998).
221. Id. § 1127.
222. H.R. Rep. No. 104-374, at 3 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1029, 1030.
223. The Act suggests eight factors for courts to consider in determining whether a
mark is famous: (1) the degree of inherent or acquired distinctiveness of the mark; (2)
the duration and extent of use of the mark in connection with the goods or services
with which the mark is used; (3) the duration and extent of advertising and publicity
of the mark; (4) the geographical extent of the trading area in which the mark is used;(5) the channels of trade for the goods or services with which the mark is used; (6) the
degree of recognition of the mark in the trading areas and channels of trade used by
the mark's owner and the person against whom the injunction is sought; (7) the nature
and extent of use of the same or similar marks by third parties; and (8) whether the
mark was registered under the Act of March 3, 1881, or the Act of February 20, 1905,
or on the principal register. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1).
224. See Pollack, supra note 62, at 532.
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The Act also carved out exceptions to dilution claims, including non-
commercial uses, news reporting, and a fair use defense for
comparative advertising, emphasizing that "[n]othing in this bill is
intended to alter existing case law on the subject of what constitutes
'commercial' speech."
The Lanham Act was recently amended once again, when the
Anticybersquatting Act was signed into law on November 29, 199 9.216
The Anticybersquatting Act was passed in the wake of courts'
attempts to confront the current trend of cybersquatters registering
domain names with the intent of selling the site to the registered
owner of the mark.27 Under the newly created section 43(d) of the
Lanham Act, a trademark owner may sue any person who has a bad
faith intent2 to profit from the mark and who registers, traffics in, or
uses a domain name that: (1) is identical or confusingly similar to a
mark that is distinctive at the time of registration of the domain name;
(2) is dilutive of a mark that is famous at the time of registration of the
domain name; or (3) falls within certain statutory protections set forth
in the Act. 9
Due to the passage of the Anticybersquatting Act, courts were
relieved from defining cybersquatting itself as an infringing or dilutive
act. Instead, courts can now find that any domain name registered in
bad faith that infringes or dilutes a distinctive or famous name may be
deemed a violation of the Anticybersquatting Act."- Courts need not
struggle to explain how a blank web site, or a site unrelated to the
senior user's product, necessarily dilutes the senior user's mark.!" For
225. H.R. Rep. No. 104-374, at 4 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1029, 1030.
226. See Lanham Act, § 43 (d), 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d), Pub. L No. 106-113, 113 Stat.
1537 (1999). The Anticybersquatting Act is discussed briefly supra, Part I.D.1.
227. For a brief discussion of cybersquatting and treatment by the courts, see supra
Part I.D.1.
228. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d). Congress provided several factors to be considered in
determining a defendant's bad faith intent in registering a mark, including: (1) the
trademark rights of the defendant; (2) whether the domain name is the legal name of
the defendant; (3) prior lawful use of the domain name; (4) lawful noncommercial or
fair use of the mark; (5) defendant's intent to divert consumers from the plaintiffs
website; (6) whether the defendant has offered to transfer or sell the domain name to
the plaintiff solely for financial gain; (7) whether the defendant has provided false
contact information in registering the site; (8) whether the defendant has acquired
multiple domain names that may infringe distinctive marks or dilute famous marks;
(9) the defendant's history of offering to transfer domain names for financial gain to
third parties; (10) defendant's history of providing false contact information in
registration of other domain names; (11) whether the trademark incorporated into the
domain name registration is distinctive or famous within the meaning of Section 43 of
the Trademark Act of 1946 (15 U.S.C. 1125). See id.
229. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d).
230. See id.
231. See Panavision Int'l, L.P. v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316. 1327 (9th Cir. 1998); see
also H.R. Rep. 106-412, at 13 (1999) (enacted) ("[Certain] cyberpirates have been
largely successful in evading the case law developed under the Federal Trademark
Dilution Act.").
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example, a consumer who types in "Starbucks.com" and brings up a
blank site will not associate the defendant's product with the
plaintiffs product because there is no such product. Yet courts,
burdened with the necessity of applying traditional trademark law
principles to the Internet,232 were previously compelled to find that a
blank or unrelated site was dilutive of a mark in order to grant a
remedy.233 Passage of the Anticybersquatting Act has put to rest the
argument that a domain name is nothing more than an address,
incapable of being registered or protected as a trademark.2m
As a result of the passage of the FTDA and the Anticybersquatting
Act, trademark owners seeking a remedy for the dilution of their
famous mark may now obtain statutory relief in federal court, even
absent customer confusion.231 Because the FTDA does not preclude
state claims,ns a trademark owner will often bring both federal and
state law dilution claims. However, because the FTDA requires that a
mark be both distinctive and famous, certain trademark owners are
even more likely to continue to bring claims under more lenient state
anti-dilution laws. 7  Plaintiffs prevailing on FIDA claims may be
entitled in certain instances to attorney's fees, treble damages, an
accounting of profits, and an order to destroy products bearing the
junior mark."s In contrast, plaintiffs in a state dilution suit will
typically be granted only injunctive relief.n9 The next part discusses
the effect of the passage of the FTDA on courts' analysis of dilution
claims, focusing on courts' resistance in following the language of the
statute. This resistance is due partially to a misunderstanding of the
doctrine of dilution, and partially to an imagined fear of a grant of a
232. Using traditional trademark law to address trademark violations over the
internet has been likened to "trying to board a moving bus .... " See 145 Cong. Rec.
S14986-15003, S15024 (1999) (testimony of Senator Leahy) (quoting Bensusan
Restaurant Corp. v. King, 126 F.3d 25,27 (2d Cir. 1997)).
233. See, e.g., Avery Dennison Corp. v. Sumpton, 999 F. Supp. 1337, 1341 (C.D.
Cal. 1998) ( finding that in the interest of equity, registering names for commercial e-
mail purposes necessarily diluted plaintiffs mark because of plaintiff's $1.2 million
investment in the mark), rev'd by 189 F.3d 868 (9th Cir. 1999).
234. See Panavision, 141 F.3d at 1327. Congress set forth several reasons why
cyberpirates can damage a mark: "First, a cyberpirate's expropriation of a mark as
part of a domain name prevents the trademark owner from using the mark as part of
its domain name. As a result, consumers seeking a trademark owner's Web site are
diverted elsewhere, which means lost business opportunities for the trademark owner.
A cyberpirate's use may also blur the distinctive quality of a mark and, when linked to
certain types of Internet activities such as pornography, may also tarnish the mark.
Finally, businesses are required to police and enforce their trademark rights by
preventing unauthorized use, or risk losing those rights entirely." H.R. Rep. 106-412,
at 6 (1999) (enacted).
235. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c). For definitions of blurring, tarnishment, and
cybersquatting, see supra Part I.D.1.
236. See Oswald, supra note 16, at 269-70.
237. See id. at 271.
238. See id. at 272.
239. See id.
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monopoly of language and design to trademark owners through a
remedy for dilution.
III. CONTINUING "CONFUSION" UNDER THE FTDA
Even after the FTDA's enactment, both state and federal courts
have continued to struggle with the notion of dilution as a remedy
separate from infringement that does not require a showing of
consumer confusion.2" Often, courts will refuse to impose liability
absent establishment of customer confusion, even where trademark
dilution exists as defined by both federal and state statutory law.2'"
One reason for this reluctance may be that the volumes of case law
examining consumer confusion make it easier for courts to analyze a
dilution violation under those standards. Courts find it difficult to
ignore that precedent, even though the standard is inapplicable in a
dilution claim. It is simply easier and more efficient to apply existing
trademark infringement law and language to the concept of dilution,
rather than create entirely new standards, especially in light of the
three different types of dilution claims. Applying existing case law has
the additional benefit of predictability of outcome. Courts have
already seen the effects of enforcing trademark infringement law, and
need not hypothesize over possible outcomes detrimental to
competition or free use of language. Many courts do not fully
understand the concept of dilution as separate from infringement,
-242
believing that dilution is simply damage to a mark that flows from
infringement, and therefore, a finding of infringement automatically
dictates a finding of dilution. Finally, one commentator has
hypothesized that judicial reluctance to enforce dilution-by-blurring in
particular stems from the subtlety of the injury to the mark,
compounded by the judicial perception that dilution grants too much
exclusivity to a mark.243
Even when courts use existing dilution law standards, the most
popular standard, set forth by the Mead Data factors, is merely a
consumer confusion standard under a different name.2 '
Unfortunately, while those factors purport to create a dilution
standard, they merely recreate an infringement standard." 5 Hence,
240. See Xuan-Thao N. Nguyen, The New Wild West. Measuring and Proving Fame
and Dilution Under the Federal Trademark Dilution Act, 63 Alb. L Rev. 201, 213
(1999) (describing the evolving case law on dilution as a "wasteland").
241. See 145 Cong. Rec. S14986-15003, S15024 (1999) (testimony of Senator
Leahy).
242. See 4 McCarthy, supra note 3, § 24:100, at 24-192.
243. See id.
244. See Oswald, supra note 16, at 285 ("Every court to date to have decided a
blurring case under the federal Act has applied these factors."). For a discussion of
the Mead Data factors, see supra Part I.D.2.
245. See Consolidated Cigar Corp. v. Monte Cristi de Tabacos, 58 F. Supp. 2d 188,
200 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (calling the first four factors of the Mead Data test nearly
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courts deciding cases of dilution-by-blurring frequently evaluate the
facts under an infringement analysis,2 6 and not based on whether
there is a mental association by the public between the two marks that
erodes the strength of the senior mark.247
The FTDA was passed to rectify and clarify erroneous analyses of
dilution. Yet the FTDA's passage has done little to change the courts'
perceptions of dilution. Many courts seem to ignore the language of
the FTDA, or misapply the precepts set forth by the statute. Instead,
both state and federal courts continue to apply erroneous precedent
to a dilution analysis, including the Mead Data factors. Worse, many
courts have begun imposing artificial restrictions on a finding of
dilution, without statutory basis.
Such misapplications exist even today. In Guess ?, Inc. v. Tres
Hermanos,14s the district court found that the purpose of protection
from dilution is to "preserve the logo as an indicator of source. 2 49
Because infringement was found, it followed that dilution could also
be found because source confusion was likely." Similarly, in Sara Lee
Corp. v. American Leather Products, Inc., 51 the court found that
defendant's "use of a confusingly similar [product] will thus dilute
[plaintiff's product] from serving as a unique identifier of high
quality... goods."'' 2  In Sony Computer Entertainment Inc. v.
Connectix Corp.,53 the Northern District of California defined
tarnishment as occurring "when a famous mark is linked to products
of poor quality or is portrayed in an unwholesome manner,"' - yet
found that it was consumers' confusion over the source of an inferior
quality video game that tarnished Sony's "PlayStation" mark; the
court thereby imposed a likelihood-of-confusion analysis to the
tarnishment claim. 55 The trial court was later reversed by the Ninth
Circuit for failure to sufficiently demonstrate a negative association
between the goods, yet the Ninth Circuit made no mention of the
identical to infringement standards).
246. See 4 McCarthy, supra note 3, § 24:94.2, at 24-176 ("[Ifn the author's view,
these factors are the offspring of classical likelihood of confusion analysis and are not
particularly relevant or helpful in resolving the issues of dilution by blurring."). For
the definition of dilution-by-blurring, see supra Part I.D.1.
247. See Nguyen, supra note 240, at 231 (proposing that none of the Mead Data
factors are appropriate to a dilution analysis under the FTDA); Oswald, supra note
16, at 282 (pointing to a failure by the courts to distinguish between blurring and
infringement as the reason for muddled blurring analyses).
248. 993 F. Supp. 1277 (C.D. Cal. 1997).
249. Id. at 1285.
250. See id.
251. No. 97 C 4158, 1998 WL 433764, at *1 (N.D. Ill. July 29, 1998).
252. Id. at *11.
253. 48 F. Supp. 2d 1212, 1223 (N.D. Cal. 1999), rev'd, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d 1706 (9th Cir.
2000).
254. Sony Computer, 48 F. Supp. 2d at 1223 (citation omitted) (emphasis omitted).
255. See id.
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infusion of a confusion standard into the district court's decision.Z5
These courts' conclusions exemplify how courts intertwine their
analyses of infringement and dilution claims under the improper
umbrella of "likelihood-of-confusion."
Circuit courts have also misinterpreted the dilution doctrine as set
forth in the FrDA. The most egregious misapplications of dilution
law include a requirement of actual harm in a dilution claim, a
limitation of dilution protection to only arbitrary or fanciful marks
rather than suggestive or descriptive marks, an application of the
dilution doctrine to only non-competitive goods, and most startlingly
in light of the principles of the dilution doctrine, the imposition of a
likelihood-of-confusion element. These cases are discussed in turn.
The Fourth Circuit recently required a showing of actual harm in a
dilution claim in Ringling Brothers-Barnum & Bailey Combined
Shows, Inc. v. Utah Division of Travel Development.' The plaintiff,
known for its trademark "The Greatest Show on Earth," attempted to
enjoin Utah's use of the trademark "The Greatest Snow on Earth" in
its travel ads. 58 Interestingly, while the lower court defined dilution
to include confusion as a required element in a blurring claim,2 9 the
Fourth Circuit recognized and corrected the lower court's erroneous
definition.2 6 However, the circuit court then incorrectly concluded
that a plaintiff must demonstrate actual harm to its selling power in
order to prove a claim of dilution.26' The court reasoned that because
the FTDA provides a remedy only for "dilution," rather than
"likelihood of dilution," and the FTDA defines dilution as the
"lessening of the capacity of a famous mark to identify and distinguish
goods or services,"' 2 the court held that the FTDA therefore requires
an "actual lessening of the senior mark's selling power.12 1' The
Fourth Circuit acknowledged that proof of actual harm would be
difficult,' and was in fact more stringent in its interpretation of the
256. See Sony Computer Entertainment, Inc. v. Connectix Corp., 53 U.S.P.Q.2d
1706,1714-15 (9th Cir. 2000).
257. 170 F.3d 449 (4th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 120 S. Ct. 286 (1999).
258. Id. at 451.
259. See Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. Utah Div. of
Travel Dev., 955 F. Supp. 605, 615 (E.D. Va. 1997), aft'd, 170 F.3d 449 (4th Cir. 1999),
and cert denied, 120 S. Ct. 286 (1999).
260. See Ringling Bros.-Barnwn & Bailey, 170 F.3d at 463.
261. See id. The court held:
If you seek to rely for proof of dilution only upon evidence of the mental
impressions evoked in consumers upon viewing the marks, then those
impressions must go beyond mere recognition of a visual similarity of the
two marks to allow a reasonable inference that the junior mark's use has
caused actual harm to the senior mark's selling or advertising power.
Id.
262. Id. at 458.
263. Id
264. See id. at 464.
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FTDA than other courts,2 65 but justified its stringent reading as
necessary to avoid granting property rights in gross to trademark
owners.266 But in imposing this requirement of actual harm, the court
erred in two respects. First, the court assumed that dilution results in
immediate injury, 67 The court failed to acknowledge that rather than
occurring overnight, dilution is the "death by a thousand cuts" of a
mark, occurring slowly over time.2" Second, the court read too much
into the meaning of the statute, substituting "excessive literalism to
defeat the intent of the statute. 2 69 Preventing a senior user from
bringing an action until the junior user has established enough
presence in the marketplace to cause actual measured harm to the
senior user would hurt both users,270 and in fact may be even more
detrimental to a junior user by allowing that user to make a
substantial investment in a mark that may later be enjoined.27'
Moreover, the FTDA offers only injunctive relief rather than
monetary damages in most cases, so it is presumable that the statute
contemplated a remedy for likelihood of dilution rather than actual
dilution, because the extreme injury of loss of revenue and
diminishment of strength of the mark in an actual dilution model
could not be compensated under the FTDA's injunction remedy.272
Unfortunately, the Fourth Circuit's actual harm requirement has
been followed in numerous district court decisions, which have
accordingly denied plaintiffs relief for failure to demonstrate actual
harm.273 As a result, state law dilution claims may increase because
the less stringent state anti-dilution statutes require only a
demonstration of a likelihood of dilution. 4 If this occurs, trademark
265. See id. at 458.
266. See id. at 459. The court recognized proof of actual harm through lost
revenue, surveys, or factors such as popularity of the marks and their similarity. See
id. at 465. For a discussion of property rights in trademark, see supra Part I.B.
267. See Nguyen, supra note 240, at 235 (positing that because the FTDA limits
most dilution claims to injunctive relief, it implicitly acknowledges that actual harm is
difficult to demonstrate or quantify).
268. See Coca-Cola Co. v. Stewart, 621 F.2d 287, 292 (8th Cir. 1980) (using the
phrase in an infringement context).
269. Nabisco, Inc. v. PF Brands, Inc., 191 F.3d 208,224 (2d Cir. 1999).
270. See id.
271. See id.
272. See id.
273. See, e.g., Planet Hollywood (Region IV), Inc. v. Hollywood Casino Corp., No.
96 C 4660, 1999 WL 1131887, at *68 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 3, 1999) (following the Ringling
Bros. holding that requires actual economic harm for a dilution claim); Playboy
Enters. Inc. v. Netscape Communications Corp., 52 U.S.P.Q.2d 1162, 1166 (C.D. Cal.
1999) (denying plaintiff injunctive relief for failing to demonstrate actual harm), affd
by 202 F.3d 278 (9th Cir. 1999); American Cyanamid Co. v. Nutraceutical Corp., 54 F.
Supp. 2d 379, 393 (D.N.J. 1999) (same); World Gym Licensing, Ltd. v. Fitness World,
Inc., 47 F. Supp. 2d 614, 625 (D. Md. 1999) (following the Ringling Bros. decision that
proof of actual dilution is required and may not be inferred).
274. See The Federal Trademark Dilution Act Becomes the "Greatest Show on
Earth"?, Intell. Prop. L. Newsletter (A.B.A. Section of Intell. Prop. L.), Summer
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owners would be confronted with the same problems the FTDA was
originally enacted to resolve, including diversified protections
afforded by the various state and federal courts,- - and limited
injunctive relief provided by state courts.
A second recent misapplication of the dilution standard occurred in
Viacom Inc. v. Ingram Enterprises, Inc.,- 6 in which the nationwide
entertainment franchise attempted to enjoin the defendant's use of
the trademark "Blockbuster Fireworks" for its fireworks stands in
Missouri and California.2" While properly defining dilution as a non-
confusing indicator of multiple sources, the Eighth Circuit refused to
find that a mark which is not fanciful or arbitrary, but merely
suggestive, merits dilution protection.278 The court held that because
the'term "Blockbuster" is a suggestive trademark- 9 rather than a
fanciful one,' the term did not merit dilution protection. The court
asserted that granting protection for a suggestive mark would
constitute "a complete monopoly on the use of a rather common word
with multiple meanings... ."" While the language of the FTDA
requires a "distinctive and famous" mark to be protected, most
commentators believe the statutory meaning of "distinctive" is a
synonym for fame, not requiring that a mark must be either
arbitrary or fanciful to be protected. Even a weak mark that is
famous may have acquired enough secondary meaning to become
distinctive. 28  Because most marks are "merely" suggestive,2
however, denial of dilution protection to suggestive marks will result
in a lack of protection for a majority of marks, hence undermining the
entire doctrine of dilution.
The Eighth Circuit incorporated a third misapplication of the
dilution standard in Luigino's Inc. v. Stouffer Corp.,m where it
decided to recognize a federal claim of dilution only for dissimilar
1999, at 1, 4.
275. For a discussion of the circumstances that prompted the passage of the FTDA,
see supra Part II.
276. 141 F.3d 886 (8th Cir. 1998).
277. See id. at 887-88.
278. See id. at 891-92 & n.9.
279. A suggestive mark is one that indirectly describes a product or service in a way
that requires a mental leap on the part of the consumer. For example, -greyhound"
may indirectly suggest that a bus service is swift and efficient, but such a connection
requires mental energy on the part on the consumer. See 2 McCarthy, supra note 3,
§11:67, at 11-111.
280. A fanciful mark is one that has been invented solely to function as a
trademark. See id. § 11:5, at 11-12. Examples of fanciful marks are Kodak cameras,
Clorox bleach, and Exxon gasoline. See id. § 11:8, at 11-14 to 11-15.
281. Viacom, 141 F.3d at 892.
282. See 4 McCarthy, supra note 3, § 24:91, at 24-154.
283. See id. at 24-154 to 24-155.
284. See 2 McCarthy, supra note 3, § 11:65, at 11-108.
285. 170 F.3d 827 (8th Cir. 1999).
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goods.2 6  The court, using a 1948 case for support, held that the
trademark "Michelina's Lean 'N Tasty," used for frozen entrees, did
not dilute Stouffer's "Lean Cuisine" trademark for the same
product.' The court stated that dilution applies only in "cases where
'similar marks are used on dissimilar goods. ' ''21 Yet, dilution of a
mark can occur even in the case of competing goods.2 89 If a junior
user uses a mark similar to the "Starbucks" logo on her coffee
product, a consumer may recognize the slight differences between the
marks and not be confused about the source of the junior product, but
the senior mark is nevertheless diluted by the unauthorized mark. In
fact, the language of the FTDA specifically states that dilution can be
found "regardless of the presence or absence of... competition
between the owner of a famous mark.... "2 While a court's decision
not to uphold a judicially-created doctrine is a common enough
phenomenon, the Eighth Circuit's disregard or obvious
misinterpretation of the FTDA is very disturbing. The court gives no
insight into its reinterpretation of the FIDA, stating only that an
action will not lie in a case of competing goods.29 1
A final blow to the dilution doctrine, as conceived by the FTDA,
occurred in Nabisco, Inc. v. PF Brands, Inc.2" The district court had
properly found, through an application of the Mead Data factors, that
Nabisco's manufacture of goldfish-shaped cheese crackers as part of a
snack mix diluted Pepperidge Farm's famous goldfish crackers.2 93 The
court determined that over time, consumers would no longer
exclusively associate a goldfish cracker with Pepperidge Farm, thus
diluting the strength of the mark.294
On appeal, the Second Circuit affirmed the lower court's decision
but modified its reasoning. 95 While it properly questioned the Mead
Data factors as an exhaustive determination of dilution-by-blurring,
the circuit court erred by stating that dilution-by-blurring factors
should incorporate an additional finding of actual confusion or a
286. See id. at 833.
287. See id. at 832-33.
288. Id. at 833 (quoting Pro-Phy-Lac-Tic Brush Co. v. Jordan Marsh Co., 165 F.2d
549, 553 (1st Cir. 1948)).
289. See 4 McCarthy, supra note 3, § 24:90, at 24-146 to 24-147.
290. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1995).
291. See Luigino's, 170 F.3d at 833.
292. 191 F.3d 208 (2d Cir. 1999).
293. See Nabisco, Inc. v. PF Brands, Inc., 50 F. Supp. 2d 188, 209-10 (S.D.N.Y.
1999) ("Nabisco's inclusion of [Pepperidge Farm's] signature element as part of the
CatDog product strikes at the heart of what dilution law is intended to prevent: the
'gradual diminution or whittling away of the value of the famous mark by blurring
uses by others'.... Over time, the presence of Nabisco's goldfish-shaped cracker
within the CatDog mix is likely to weaken the focus of consumers on the true source
of the Goldfish." (citations omitted)), affd, 191 F.3d 208 (2d Cir. 1999).
294. See id. at 210.
295. See Nabisco, 191 F.3d at 228 (modifying the application of the Mead Data
factors by the lower court).
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likelihood of confusion.2% The court acknowledged that neither
actual confusion nor likelihood of confusion was necessary to a
dilution claim, but found that evidence of confusion could be "highly
probative" of dilution,297 reasoning that "[c]onfusion lessens
distinction" and results in the blurring of a mark.-' While the court
was correct in stating that a mark causing customer confusion may
also cause dilution, it erred by inserting a confusion element into a
dilution analysis because the claims require two separate states of
consumer perception. 299 One event does not necessarily trigger the
other. More dangerously, to reinsert a confusion standard into a
dilution claim causes dilution to fall prey once again to doctrinal
murkiness, reestablishing infringement as the only grounds for
recovery in a trademark violation. Despite Congressional intent,
demonstrated by the clear language of the FTDA stating that dilution
can be found absent likelihood-of-confusion, the Second Circuit
reintroduced a confusion element into the dilution doctrine.n ° By
doing so, the Second Circuit in essence devolved dilution back into
infringement and disregarded a federal statute in the process.
Despite courts' continued melding of the elements of infringement
claims with dilution claims, consumer confusion has no place in a
dilution analysis. The doctrines have separate factors and separate
states of consumer perception.-" A mark found to be infringing
because it confuses a portion of the population may also be deemed
diluting because another segment of the population, while not
confused by the mark, nevertheless associates it with the junior mark.
But dilution does not flow from infringement. Accordingly, the
reintroduction of a confusion element essentially denies plaintiffs a
dilution remedy because they are once again forced to demonstrate
confusion where none exists.
Moreover, because plaintiffs are not required to prove confusion
under the FTDA's definition of dilution, the dilution standard
necessarily has a lower burden of proof than an infringement claim.
This lower burden of proof, in theory, gives plaintiffs an opportunity
to minimize damage to their marks because dilution acts to protect
trademark owners from irreparable harm to a trademark's unique
features. Unfortunately, because of the on-going mischaracterization
of the dilution standard, as exemplified by Nabisco, such plaintiffs
296. See id. at 228.
297. Id. at 221.
298. Id.
299. See 4 McCarthy, supra note 3, § 24:70, at 24-122.
300. See, eg., New York State Soc'y of Certified Pub. Accountants v. Eric Louis
Assocs., Inc., 99 Civ. 3030, 1999 WL 1084220, at *13 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 2, 1999)
(following the Second Circuit's factoring in of actual confusion in deciding a dilution
claim).
301. For a discussion of the definition of dilution as compared to infringement, see
supra Part I.D.1.
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often are not afforded the protections they deserve.
Despite the continued muddling of the dilution doctrine even after
the passage of the FTDA, a few courts have cast light on the shadows
of statutory interpretation of the Act. Those courts have recognized
that a finding of confusion is not a prerequisite for a finding of
dilution, but that dilution requires a different mental association.3" In
Hasbro, Inc. v. Clue Computing, Inc.," for example, the manufacturer
of the board game, Clue, sought an injunction preventing a computer
consulting partnership from using the website "clue.com."3°  In
assessing the plaintiffs claim, the district court defined the required
mental association as "something akin to confusion-the mistaken
association of both products with the mark .... ,0 After stating that
this mental association is necessary to a successful dilution claim, the
court took the additional step, typically neglected by most courts, of
assessing this mental association and determining whether it rose to
the level of endangerment of dilution in the public mind.3 6 While the
court concluded that dilution did not exist in that case,3° it recognized
that if consumers associate both the junior and senior product with the
senior mark, even if they are not confused about the differing sources
of those products, the senior mark is vulnerable to dilution °.30
While most courts continue to ignore dilution as a doctrine separate
and apart from infringement and hence consumer confusion,3°9 the
district court's analysis in Hasbro does give hope. If federal courts
would look to the FTDA's text and Congressional intent in enacting
federal protection for dilution claims, dilution could emerge from the
shadow of infringement as a separate and unique theory of trademark
302. See, e.g., I.P. Lund Trading ApS v. Kohler Co., 163 F.3d 27, 48-49 (1st Cir.
1998) ("While there may be a tendency to think of dilution in terms of confusion,
Congress made it clear that dilution can occur even in the absence of confusion.");
Nexxus Prods. Co. v. CVS New York, Inc., No. CIV. A. 97-40197-PBS, 1999 WL
498051, at *4 (D. Mass. July 8, 1999) ("Consumer perception... is a key element in
establishing a dilution claim."); Nabisco, Inc. v. PF Brands, Inc., 191 F.3d 208, 219 (2d
Cir. 1999) ("Consumer confusion-the nub of an action for infringement-is, of
course, unnecessary to show the actionable dilution of a famous mark."); Ringling
Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. B.E. Windows Corp., 937 F. Supp.
204, 208 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (acknowledging that dilution may be found even absent
customer confusion). For an analysis of the lower court's decision in Nabisco, see
notes 293-95 and accompanying text.
303. 66 F. Supp. 2d 117 (D. Mass. 1999).
304. See id. at 120.
305. Id. at 134.
306. See id.
307. See id. at 136.
308. See id.
309. See, e.g., Nabisco, Inc. v. PF Brands, Inc., 191 F.3d 208, 228 (2d Cir. 1999)
(inserting a confusion factor into analysis of dilution claims); Guess ? Inc. v. Tres
Hermanos, 993 F. Supp. 1277, 1284-85 (C.D. Cal. 1997) (holding that a finding of
dilution necessarily follows a finding of infringement); Sara Lee Corp. v. American
Leather Prods., Inc., No. 97 C 4158, 1998 WL 433764, at *1 (N.D. I11. July 29, 1998)
(finding that customer confusion dilutes products).
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protection. Even where courts give the FTDA its full due, however,
an appropriate standard by which to measure dilution is still lacking. 10
The next part proposes a model that sets forth factors courts can use
to analyze dilution in keeping with the purpose and clear language of
both the FTDA and most state anti-dilution statutes, and without
resulting in a grant of monopoly to trademark owners.
IV. PROPOSED SOLUTIONS TO THE SHADOWING OF DILUTION
Many courts still cannot distinguish between a blurring claim and an
infringement claim,31 1 despite the straightforward Congressional
language in the FTDA and the increasing number of suits that include
a separate claim for dilution. Often, courts believe that the perception
of consumer confusion is identical to the perception of mental
association, and will use the two states of mind interchangeably.
Thus, courts will view dilution and infringement as descriptions of the
same phenomenon. Courts frequently believe that infringement
describes the confusion a customer experiences upon viewing a similar
mark, and that dilution is the ensuing weakening of the mark.
Dilution is not, however, a consequence of infringement.3 13 Rather,
dilution is a separate concept, independent of an infringement claim,
and should not be analyzed using infringement standards. Those
courts that do understand that dilution should be analyzed apart from
infringement resist properly evaluating dilution-by-blurring, the most
common dilution claim. Those courts fear that following the language
of the FTDA will result in an overexpansion of trademark protections,
resulting in a monopoly of a mark's language and design by its owner
to the detriment of competition. 314
This part will examine and allay those fears, and suggest a modified
standard that is neither a grant of property rights in gross nor an
ineffectual strawman, but one that courts can use to evaluate a
dilution-by-blurring claim so that blurring may be identified by courts
as effectively as dilution-by-tarnishment and dilution-by-
cybersquatting. Courts should adopt this standard rather than using a
traditional customer confusion standard that results in the re-
incorporation of an infringement standard into dilution.
Courts' reluctance to recognize dilution as a distinct claim equal to
or greater in remedy than an infringement claim is demonstrated by
310. See Nguyen, supra note 240, at 202 (describing dilution analyses as a
"wasteland").
311. See Oswald, supra note 16, at 282.
312- See Holiday Inns, Inc. v. Holiday Out in Am., 481 F.2d 445,450 (5th Cir. 1973)
(finding that two marks are not "confusing").
313. See 4 McCarthy, supra note 3, § 24:70, at 24-121.
314. See, eg., Viacom Inc. v. Ingram Enters., Inc., 141 F.3d 886, 892 (8th Cir. 1998)
(refusing to grant a dilution claim because it would constitute "a complete monopoly
on the use of a rather common word with multiple meanings").
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the Second, Fourth, and Eighth Circuits' recent imposition of artificial
limitations on the dilution doctrine.3 15 In raising the burden for
dilution plaintiffs, the Fourth Circuit, while holding that confusion
need not be proved, required that a plaintiff show actual harm.1 6 The
Eighth Circuit held that suggestive marks are not protected from
dilution,317 and the Second Circuit actually reincorporated a confusion
standard back into its analysis of a dilution claim.318 Yet other courts,
while not incorrectly modifying dilution standards, have embraced the
Mead Data factors which are basically a reincarnation of the
likelihood-of-confusion standard.319 By incorporating these six factors
into a balancing test, courts seemingly weigh the evidence instead of
blindly granting injunctions simply because a famous mark has been
copied. Yet, the Mead Data factors both incorporate inappropriate
standards of infringement 30 and overlook the paramount factor of
mental association in dilution claims. 21 What appears to be an
objective evaluation of the evidence is in fact an erroneous application
of an inappropriate standard.
Some courts have recognized the weaknesses of the existing
standard and have attempted to modify the Mead Data factors in
order to provide a new and improved test for dilution.322 One
suggested solution is to apply to a dilution analysis only two of the
Mead Data factors, similarity of the marks and fame of the senior
mark, because the other criteria simulate an infringement analysis. 323
However, even this amended version ignores the utility of some of the
factors in measuring blurring and the requirement of a finding of a
315. For a discussion of property rights in trademarks, see supra Part I.B.
316. See Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. Utah Div. of
Travel Dev., 170 F.3d 449, 463 (4th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 120 S. Ct. 286 (1999). For
a discussion of the Ringling Brothers opinion, see supra notes 257-75 and
accompanying text.
317. See Viacom, 141 F.3d at 892. For a discussion of the Viacom case, see supra
notes 276-84 and accompanying text.
318. See Nabisco, Inc. v. PF Brands, Inc., 191 F.3d 208,227-28 (2d Cir. 1999). For a
discussion of the Nabisco case, see supra notes 292-300 and accompanying text.
319. Commentators have decried the "factorization" of decisions by courts in
trademark law, which encourages courts to run down a checklist rather than weigh the
evidence and make a finding of fact. See Oswald, supra note 16, at 297. For a
discussion of the Mead Data factors, see supra Part I.D.2.
320. See, e.g., Oswald, supra note 16, at 297-98 (opining that the Mead Data factors
are inappropriate to a dilution-by-blurring analysis); 4 McCarthy, supra note 3, §
24:94.2, at 24-176 (stating that the Mead Data factors "are not particularly relevant or
helpful in resolving the issues of dilution-by-blurring").
321. For a discussion of mental association in dilution and the Mead Data factors,
see supra Part I.D.2.
322. See, e.g., Oswald, supra note 16, at 297-98 (proposing to eliminate the Mead
Data factors and rely on an analysis of the similarity of the marks and empirical data
provided by the parties that demonstrate blurring).
323. See 4 McCarthy, supra note 3, § 24:94.2, at 24-176 (proposing to eliminate all
but the fame of the senior mark and similarity between the marks from a dilution
analysis).
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mental association between the marks.324 More importantly, such an
analysis becomes a grant of property rights in gross to the senior user
because dilution would thus be found from the use of any mark
sufficiently similar to a famous mark. Yet, this paradigm would in fact
create the very monopoly courts are attempting to restrict. For
example, assuming the mark "United Sugar" is sufficiently similar to
the mark "United Airlines," dilution would be found. But many32
consumers may view "United Sugar" and have no mental association
whatsoever with United Airlines, either because of the inherent
weakness of the term "United" or because of the dissimilarity of the
products. Therefore, further analysis of the factors contributing to
dilution must be utilized to avoid conceding a monopoly of language
to famous marks in each alleged case.
In light of the harm that blurring inflicts, it is not surprising that the
standards analyzing dilution set forth by courts are incomplete.
Blurring is a subtle injury, a "death by a thousand cuts,"" 6 and
therefore is difficult to quantify. To evaluate such a claim, courts
must make an assessment unique to a dilution analysis-the likelihood
that consumers will begin associating the two marks, thereby
weakening the strength of the senior mark. No court thus far has
encompassed all of the factors important to a sound analysis of a
dilution claim. Instead, courts use a set of factors that may create the
impression that an assessment is made. In fact, they assess only the
relative placement of the marks in commerce, rather than the
relationship created in the mind of the public between the two marks.
This Note proposes that the factors that courts should consider in
addressing any dilution-by-blurring claim are:
Renown of the senior mark;
Similarity of the marks;
Similarity of the products;
324. An important exception is Hasbro, Inc. v. Clue Computing, Inc., 66 F. Supp. 2d
117, 121-22 (D. Mass. 1999), discussed supra, notes 303-308 and accompanying text.
The Massachusetts district court found that in addition to the Sweet factors approved
by McCarthy as appropriate to a dilution claim, the court must also assess the mental
association made by customers upon viewing both marks. See id. at 134-36. The
Fourth Circuit also added a mental association factor to a modified Mead Data
analysis in Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. Utah Division of
Travel Development, 170 F.3d 449, 453 (4th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 120 S. Ct. 286
(1999), as originally proposed in the lower court's decision, but the circuit court
inserted an additional requirement of actual confusion. See notes 257-75 and
accompanying text for a discussion of the Ringling Bros. holding.
325. The number of consumers who have a mental association between the marks
to constitute a dilution of the senior mark may be analogized to the infringement
standard, which holds that an "appreciable" number of buyers must be confused by
similar marks to constitute an infringement claim. See 3 McCarthy, supra note 3, §
23:2, at 23-9. An "appreciable" number of consumers has been found to be anywhere
from 11 to 49 percent. See id.
326. Coca-Cola Co. v. Stewart, 621 F.2d 287,292 (8th Cir. 1980).
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Predatory intent;327
Mental association.
The first four factors replicate four of the six Mead Data factors,
while the final factor reflects the majority's analysis in Mead Data.
While the third factor, similarity of the products, and the fourth
factor, predatory intent, have been criticized as factors appropriate to
an infringement analysis but irrelevant in a dilution claim3 28 this Note
proposes that in fact these factors are helpful in gauging dilution when
used in conjunction with the other factors.
First, assessing the renown of the senior mark answers the FTDA's
requirement that the plaintiffs mark be famous.329  Second, by
evaluating the similarity of the marks to measure whether they are
"essentially the same "330 or of "sufficient similarity. . . to evoke an
'instinctive mental association' of the two [marks],' 331 a court can
gauge the likelihood that a consumer will perceive the junior user's
mark to be similar to the senior user's, thereby weakening the latter.
If a mark bears only a slight resemblance to the senior mark, dilution
of the senior mark will probably not occur.
Next, an appraisal of the similarity of the products at issue is
important, as similar products reinforce a consumer's perception of
similar marks. 32 While the "Starbucks" mark for coffee products may
be diluted by, for example, a "Marducks" mark for coffee products,
the "Marducks" mark for sneakers would probably have little or no
effect on the "Starbucks" mark. While lack of similarity between
goods is not a definitive indication of lack of dilution and is not
required under the FTDA, similarity between goods can create
dilution where the same claim would not exist between non-
competing goods. Some commentators argue, however, that a
similarity-of-goods analysis is appropriate only to an infringement
claim, 3 3 because the purpose of dilution is to provide a remedy for
327. See Mead Data Cent., Inc. v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., 875 F.2d 1026,
1037-38 (2d Cir. 1989) (Sweet, J., concurring).
328. See 4 McCarthy, supra note 3, § 24:94.2, at 24-176.
329. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1995).
330. 4 McCarthy, supra note 3, § 24:90.2, at 24-151 to 24-152 (quoting I.P. Lund
Trading ApS v. Kohler Co., 163 F.3d 27, 50 (1st Cir. 1998)).
331. 4 McCarthy, supra note 3, § 24:90.2, at 24-152 (quoting Ringling Bros.-Barnum
& Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. Utah Div. of Travel Dev., 170 F.3d 449, 458 (4th
Cir. 1999)).
332. See Planet Hollywood (Region IV), Inc. v. Hollywood Casino Corp., No. 96 C
4660, 1999 WL 1131887, at *52 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 3, 1999) (finding that an analysis of
similarity of products is appropriate to a dilution-by-blurring claim because similarity
of goods will strengthen the likelihood that a consumer makes a mental association
between the two marks).
333. See, e.g., Nguyen, supra note 240, at 214 ("[Tlhe 'similarity of the products'
factor is improper in determining dilution-by-blurring because it focuses on likelihood
of confusion and is contrary to the Congressional intent under the Dilution Act.");
Gregg Duffey, Comment, Trademark Dilution Under the Federal Trademark Dilution
Act of 1995: You've Come a Long Way Baby-Too Far, Maybe?, 39 S. Tex. L. Rev.
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non-competing goods.3" However, to preclude a plaintiff from relief
for dilution of a mark simply because the junior user's products are
competitive with her own is to deny redress to an even more flagrant
attempt to capitalize on the goodwill and investment of a senior
holder, the very act that the FTDA was intended to prevent.!"
Further, the language of the FTDA specifically allows dilution to be
found "regardless of the presence or absence of... competition"
between the marks.3 36
Additionally, predatory intent can gauge the defendant's own
evaluation of the likelihood of a mental association between the
marks.31  While the language of the FTDA does not include an
element weighing the bad faith of the defendant, except in assessing
damages,38 a finding that the defendant purposely chose the senior
user's mark for her own goods in order to benefit from the investment
and goodwill made in the senior mark can provide empirical evidence
of a mental association between the marks, thereby causing dilution. 39
The recent Anticybersquatting amendment to the Lanham Act, which
sets forth a bad faith intent requirement for a cause of action for using
a domain name, demonstrates Congress's belief that a defendant's bad
faith intent is a worthwhile gauge of trademark dilution.-" If a
defendant's very purpose in choosing a name is to dilute the goodwill
and value invested in that name by the senior mark holder, dilution is
likely to be found by a court.4
Finally, the most significant factor in measuring dilution is a finding
of mental association as proposed by the majority in Mead Daa. 2
133, 162 (1997) ("[Slimilarity of the products-should not be included in any blurring
claim, especially in a claim under the FTDA.").
334. See 4 McCarthy, supra note 3, § 24:94.2, at 24-176.
335. See Statement of the United States Trademark Assoc in Support of S. 1883
(DeConcini) The Trademark Law Revision Act, reprinted in 78 Trademark Rep. 382,
404 (1988).
336. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1995) (emphasis added).
337. Predatory intent exists where a junior user chooses a trademark in order to
benefit commercially from the senior mark. See Mead Data Cent., Inc. v. Toyota
Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., 875 F.2d 1026, 1037 (2d Cir. 1989) (Sweet, J.. concurring).
338. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c).
339. See Mead Data, 875 F.2d at 1037 (Sweet, J., concurring) ("[T]he fact that the
junior user believes it can benefit commercially from copying the senior user's
trademark provides strong evidence of the likelihood of blurring.").
340. For a discussion of the Anticybersquatting Act, see supra notes 226-34 and
accompanying text.
341. See, eg., Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. Utah Div.
of Travel Dev., 955 F. Supp. 598, 620 (E.D. Va. 1997) (finding that the likelihood of
blurring is increased by a junior user's selection of a famous mark for the purpose of
benefiting from that mark). The district court's use of predatory intent was overruled
by the Fourth Circuit, which found that predatory intent and other of the Mead Data
factors were irrelevant to a dilution analysis. See Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey
Combined Shows, Inc. v. Utah Div. Of Travel Dev., 170 F.3d 449, 464 (4th Cir. 1999),
cert denied, 120 S. Ct. 286 (1999).
342. See Mead Data, 875 F.2d at 1030-31.
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This mental association assesses whether a consumer, upon viewing
the junior mark, will be reminded of the senior mark. 3 The appraisal
is crucial to a dilution-by-blurring evaluation, because dilution-by-
blurring is defined as the creation of a mental association between the
marks that falls short of confusion. If such a mental association is not
found, there is de facto no dilution and the claim fails. To attempt to
analyze blurring without evaluating the public's perception of the
marks is to fall prey to a vague standard that only skirts the borders of
dilution.
Two of the Mead Data factors, renown of the junior mark and
sophistication of consumers, on the other hand, are irrelevant to a
dilution analysis. Renown of the junior mark was incorporated by
Judge Sweet3 into the dilution analysis from the infringement
standard that measures the likelihood that the senior user will expand
into the field of the junior user."5 Yet this factor is immaterial" 6
because any exposure to the junior mark, small or large, will dilute the
senior mark.347 Indeed, even Judge Sweet acknowledged that such a
factor would be irrelevant in a typical dilution claim,34s and introduced
it into his analysis because of the peculiar nature of Mead Data's
facts-the threat that the junior user's line of Lexus automobiles
would someday overwhelm the less famous Lexis-Nexis mark" 9
Further, because trademark dilution seeks a remedy in equity, the
doctrine of laches applies, requiring senior users to police their marks
vigorously, regardless of the extent of the unauthorized use.350 Fame
of the senior mark is a requirement of the FTDA,35 and therefore the
overall analysis of dilution has already determined the senior mark's
renown. Accordingly, even the small segment of the population that
recognizes the junior and senior mark will link them, thereby diluting
the strength of the senior mark for that small exposed segment of the
population. Thus, even a geographically isolated junior user can still
cause dilution to the senior mark, although only in that area and only
for a limited number of consumers 5 2
343. See 4 McCarthy, supra note 3, § 24:70, at 24-122.
344. See Mead Data, 875 F.2d at 1038.
345. See Polaroid Corp. v. Polarad Elecs. Corp., 287 F.2d 492, 495 (2d Cir. 1961).
346. See Oswald, supra note 16, at 294-95.
347. See, e.g., Christian Dior, S.A.R.L. v. Miss Dior of Flatbush, Inc., 173 U.S.P.Q.
416, 418 (E.D.N.Y. 1972) ("A well-known trademark is entitled to protection against
the use of the name in a non-competing business and even by a small operator.").
348. See Mead Data, 875 F.2d at 1038 (Sweet, J., concurring) ("This case raises an
issue that is likely to arise rarely in dilution law-the prospect that a junior mark may
become so famous that it will overwhelm the senior mark.").
349. See id. at 1038-39.
350. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1) (granting owners of senior marks equitable relief
for unauthorized use of a mark that dilutes the senior mark).
351. See id. § 1125(c).
352. See 4 McCarthy, supra note 3, § 24:68, at 24-120.
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Moreover, the sophistication of buyers is unimportant. 353 This
factor, which measures a customer's likelihood of making a mental
association between the two marks, is based on the supposition that
the more sophisticated the consumer, the less likely that the consumer
would make a mistaken mental association between the two marks.3'
In dilution, however, the opposite effect occurs. The more
sophisticated the consumer, the more likely the consumer will make
the mental leap between the marks where an association between the
two marks is made."
Rather than dodging dilution claims by reverting to a likelihood-of-
confusion standard, or inventing new barriers to successful claims,
courts should continue to apply the Mead Data factors but in modified
form, limiting a blurring analysis to the four Mead factors preserved
above.356 Additionally, courts should incorporate an element that
analyzes the likelihood of the public's mental association between the
marks. While these findings of fact may be based on empirical forms
of evidence, such as survey data or demonstrations of loss of revenue,
a fact-finder should not hesitate to make a determination of mental
association simply by viewing the junior mark and assessing her own
reaction to it.
Additionally, finders of fact should not censor their opinions in
order to avoid granting an imagined property-right-in-gross.31
Because federal dilution relief is limited to only the most famous of
marks, occurring only after the mental association that constitutes
dilution is found,5" recognizing blurring claims will not result in a
blanket grant of property rights in gross, and a resulting monopoly
over the trademark's words and designs to all trademark owners in all
situations. Indeed, existing recognition by courts of dilution-by-
tarnishment and cybersquatting has resulted in an expansion of
traditional trademark protections without a commensurate grant of
monopoly. Specifically, the recent passage of the Anticybersquatting
Act359 codifies judicially created solutions to cybersquatting and
consequentially expands trademark protection. Under the
Anticybersquatting Act, protection may be given against a registrant
who purchases domain names but does not contact the senior user of
the mark to ransom back the site.' To define dilution as a mere
purchase of a site with intent to dilute the mark but with no
substantial action taken expands existing property rights and rises to
353. See Oswald, supra note 16, at 292.
354. See Mead Data, 875 F.2d at 1036-37.
355. See Hershey Foods Corp. v. Mars, Inc., 998 F. Supp. 500,521 (M.D. Pa. 1998).
356. See supra notes 327-41 and accompanying text.
357. For a discussion of property rights in trademark, see supra Part I.B.
358. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1995).
359. For a discussion of the Anticybersquatting Act, see supra notes 226-34 and
accompanying text.
360. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d).
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the level of a grant of property rights in gross to a trademark owner.3 6'
But no resulting monopolies occur because there are other limitations
in place on such protections.36 A similar expansion of protection in
blurring claims will likely have the same negligible effect on
monopoly. Moreover, the modified Mead Data analysis would
effectively limit dilution remedies only to those famous marks that
would truly suffer dilution by the junior user. Finally, fair use
limitations are already set forth by the FrDA, effectively preserving
competition among products.363
Hence, while courts may continue to hesitate to grant property
rights in trademark, this Note advocates an expansion in protection by
embracing dilution-by-blurring as set forth in the FTDA. Further, this
Note proposes a standard that objectively evaluates both marks by
using several of the Mead Data factors to measure blurring, including:
renown of the senior mark; similarity of the marks; similarity of the
products; and predatory intent.3" Furthermore, this Note sets forth an
additional factor to a blurring analysis: a measurement of mental
association. Where such an association exists, balanced by the
existence of other of the factors listed above, dilution of a famous
mark has occurred.
To perpetuate the present suspicion and avoidance of the dilution
standard is to undermine the promotion of business and commerce.
Without dilution protection, trademark owners fall prey to those
junior users who could wantonly steal a mark without fear of reprisal,
thereby discouraging investment in a trademark by its owner.
Trademarks impart valuable information to the purchasing public
about the quality of goods and services, and are therefore worthy of
courts' protection even absent traditional consumer confusion and
despite fear of monopoly.
361. Black's Law Dictionary defines the term "property" as entailing an ownership
that includes the "unrestricted and exclusive right to a thing," and "to possess it, to
use it, and to exclude everyone else from interfering with it." See Black's Law
Dictionary 1216 (6th ed. 1990). But see Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined
Shows, Inc. v. Utah Div. of Travel Dev., 170 F.3d 449,459 (4th Cir. 1999), cert. denied,
120 S. Ct. 286 (1999) (holding that if Congress had intended to create property rights
in gross in passage of the FTDA, it would have stated such a drastic intention). By
analogy, Congress would have been equally explicit in setting forth such a grant in the
Anticybersquatting Act amendment to the Lanham Act.
362. Other requirements set forth by the Anticybersquatting Act may include bad
faith, use in commerce, and history of cybersquatting. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d). For a
discussion of the Anticybersquatting Act, see supra notes 226-34 and accompanying
text.
363. H.R. Rep. No. 104-374, at 4 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1029, 1030.
364. See Mead Data Cent., Inc. v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., 875 F.2d 1026,
1035-40 (2d Cir. 1989) (Sweet, J., concurring).
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CONCLUSION
The dilution doctrine has struggled for over fifty years to emerge
from the shadow of trademark infringement. As American business
and trade has increased, along with different ways of infringing a
mark, so has the need for multiple protections for the goodwill and
investment made by trademark owners. While the recognition of
dilution has gained momentum, first in state law and then by Congress
through the passage of the FTDA, the doctrine continues to be
plagued by courts' reluctance to afford protection due to a distaste for
granting monopolies and because of a misunderstanding of the
appropriate standard for assessing a dilution claim. Hence, instead of
the dilution doctrine gaining more acceptance, it continues to be
compromised by the courts. The only hope for recognition of the
dilution doctrine in its own right lies in the acceptance of dilution
theory in general, and more importantly, in the adoption of a revised
dilution standard. Only when this revised standard is adopted by all
courts will trademark owners be afforded the protection from dilution
that Congress intended.
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